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DO CONSERVATIVE JUSTICES FAVOR WALL STREET? 
IDEOLOGY AND THE SUPREME COURT’S SECURITIES 
REGULATION DECISIONS† 
Johannes W. Fedderke* 
Marco Ventoruzzo** 
 The appointment of Supreme Court justices is a politically-charged 
process and the “ideology” (or “judicial philosophy”) of the nominees is 
perceived as playing a potentially relevant role in their future decision-
making. It is fairly easy to intuit that ideology somehow enters the 
analysis with respect to politically divisive issues such as abortion and 
procreative rights, sexual conduct, freedom of speech, separation of 
church and state, gun control, procedural protections for the accused in 
criminal cases, and governmental powers. Many studies have tackled the 
question of the relevance of the ideology of the Justices or appellate 
judges on these issues, often finding a correlation between policy 
preferences and decisions. This Article fills a gap in the existing literature 
examining the correlation between ideology and judicial decision-making 
in the highly technical area of securities regulation. We address the 
question if “conservative Justices” are more “pro Wall Street,” and 
“liberal Justices” more “pro investors.” Our results confirm that, even 
using different definitions and measures of ideology, conservative 
Justices favor “free and less regulated markets,” and liberal Justices are 
more protective of investors, especially small investors, more concerned 
about market failures, and more in favor of private plaintiffs or 
government intervention. Two caveats are important. First, we do not 
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associate any negative implication with the fact that ideology plays a role 
in deciding “hard cases.” Obviously our study does not in any way imply 
that the Justices distort the law in order to achieve predetermined policy 
goals, but simply that, when the law is ambiguous, different and 
legitimate interpretative approaches and policy considerations might lead 
to different outcomes. The best guarantee of good decision-making is not 
an abstract aspiration to a completely apolitical adjudicator, but in a 
diverse composition of our courts. Second, while the data indicate a 
meaningful correlation, the correlation does not entirely explain the 
positions of the Justices, therefore confirming the independence and 
prestige of the Supreme Court and its members.  
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INTRODUCTION 
President Ronald Reagan nominated Judge Robert Bork for Associate 
Justice of the Supreme Court in 1987.1 Before his confirmation hearing 
at the Senate, Senator Ted Kennedy took the floor and delivered a 
statement that was a death knell to Judge Bork’s appointment: 
Robert Bork’s America is a land in which women would be 
forced into back-alley abortions, blacks would sit at 
segregated lunch counters, rogue police could break down 
citizens’ doors in midnight raids, and schoolchildren could 
not be taught about evolution, writers and artists could be 
censored at the whim of government, and the doors of the 
federal courts would be shut on the fingers of millions of 
Americans.2  
The Senate did not confirm Judge Bork’s nomination.3 
A few decades earlier, in what was one of the first modern 
confirmation hearings, the Senate was discussing the nomination of then-
Professor Felix Frankfurter by President Franklin Roosevelt.4 The year 
was 1939.5 The proposed appointment of a liberal judge of Jewish 
descent, who was born in Austria and co-founded the ACLU, was both a 
symbolic attack on the Nazi gangrene spreading in Europe and a spark 
for a controversy ready to flame in America.6 Several people testified 
before the Senate Judiciary Committee opposing Frankfurter.7 Allen Zoll, 
the executive vice president of the American Federation Against 
Communism, went on the record saying:  
There are two reasons why I oppose the appointment of Prof. 
Felix Frankfurter to the Supreme Court of the United States. 
One is because I believe his record proves him unfit for the 
position, irrespective of his race, and the other is because of 
his race. . . . [T]he Jew has been fostering movements that 
                                                                                                                     
 1. See John M. Broder, Social Causes Defined Kennedy, Even at the End of a 46-Year 
Career in the Senate, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/27/us/politi 
cs/27kennedy.html. 
 2. Id.  
 3. For an account of Bork’s failed appointment, see L. A. Powe Jr., From Bork to Souter, 
27 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 781, 783–84 (1991); see also THE BORK HEARINGS: HIGHLIGHTS FROM 
THE MOST CONTROVERSIAL JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION BATTLE IN U.S. HISTORY 163 (Ralph E. 
Shaffer ed., 2005).  
 4. Lori A. Ringhand, Aliens on the Bench: Lessons in Identity, Race and Politics from the 
First “Modern” Supreme Court Confirmation Hearing to Today, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REV. 795, 
797. 
 5. Id. at 797. 
 6. Id. at 798–99, 819. 
 7. Id. at 801. 
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are subversive to our Government.8  
Notwithstanding the anti-Semitic rants of Mr. Zoll and other 
witnesses, the Senate confirmed Frankfurter, who went on to serve for 
twenty-three years on the Court.9  
These two anecdotes corroborate, if necessary, that the appointment 
of Supreme Court Justices is a politically charged process and that the 
“ideology” of the nominees appears to play a potentially relevant role in 
their future decision-making. To clarify, this Article’s use of the term 
ideology does not in any way imply any negative connotation. A 
synonym could be “judicial philosophy,” referring to a vision of the 
world, a system of beliefs, and a policy perspective that combine to affect 
the way Justices interpret the law. It is not meant to imply a bias or an 
intentional distortion of the law to achieve a predetermined result. It 
simply means that when there is room for interpretation and reasonable 
minds can disagree, Justices and judges can reach different conclusions 
based on their values, understandings, and beliefs. In the last few decades, 
the process of nominating and confirming Justices appears to have 
become increasingly more partisan.10 
Numerous jurists in the United States, especially up through the 
1940s, argued that legal interpretation can and should be separated from, 
and not influenced by, politics or other ideological beliefs. According to 
this “legalist” perspective, stare decisis and the original interpretation of 
statutes constrain judges and prevent creative judicial decision-making.11  
Although somewhat out of fashion after the legal realism movement, 
                                                                                                                     
 8. Id. at 797 (alteration in original).  
 9. Joseph Gumina, From Austria to Sacco and Vanzetti: The Development of Frankfurter’s 
“Fundamental Rights” Theory, 30 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 389, 395–96, 400 (2008). Despite Justice 
Frankfurter’s liberal tendencies, his belief in judicial restraint often put him at odds with other 
Justices such as Hugo Black, William Douglas, and Chief Justice Earl Warren. See JOSEPH P. 
LASH, FROM THE DIARIES OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 80–81, 83 (1975); Melvin I. Urofsky, Conflict 
Among the Brethren: Felix Frankfurter, William O. Douglas and the Clash of Personalities and 
Philosophies on the United States Supreme Court, 1988 DUKE L.J. 71, 81–83, 111, 105. For an 
insightful view of Justice Frankfurter’s positions, see generally LASH, supra. 
 10. See Joseph E. Frank, Politics and Judicial Nomination: The Supreme Court from 
Reagan Through Bush, 34 VT. B.J. 53, 53 (2008) (reviewing JAN CRAWFORD GREENBERG, 
SUPREME CONFLICT: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF THE UNITED STATES 
SUPREME COURT (2007)). 
 11. See Stephen M. Feldman, Do Supreme Court Nominees Lie? The Politics of 
Adjudication, 18 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 17, 19 (2008) (arguing that Supreme Court judicial 
decisions are “politics writ small”). For a description of this approach, see also Stephen M. 
Feldman, The Rule of Law or the Rule of Politics? Harmonizing the Internal and External Views 
of Supreme Court Decision Making, 30 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 89, 96–98 (2005) (asserting that 
legal scholars and judges believe the law influences the Court more than politics); Barry 
Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 TEX. L. REV. 257, 258, 276 & n.95 (2005) 
(comparing positive and normative views of judicial decision-making).  
4
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these arguments still appear, particularly in the appointments process. For 
example, at his confirmation hearing, Chief Justice John Roberts 
proclaimed: “[J]udges are like umpires—umpires don’t make the rules; 
they apply them.”12 This is an idea as old as the concept of separation of 
powers. In the early eighteenth century, Montesquieu famously remarked 
that “[m]ais les juges de la nation ne sont, comme nous avons dit, que la 
bouche qui prononce les paroles de la loi,” invoking a slightly different 
metaphor than Justice Roberts’s but making the same point: the proper 
role of the judiciary is simply to “declare” what the law is.13  
If legal interpretation was such a mechanistic activity, society would 
not need judges and lawyers at all; society could simply feed into a 
computer the existing laws and regulations along with the facts of a case, 
and it would spit back the “mathematically” infallible outcome.14 Even 
without subscribing to the battle cry of “critical legal studies” that “Law 
is Politics!”15 or without surrendering completely to the notion of legal 
indeterminacy, it is difficult to seriously argue that the cultural, social, 
racial, economic, religious, and political backgrounds and beliefs of 
judges (in one word, their ideologies) do not play some role in how they 
                                                                                                                     
 12. Robert Schwartz, Like They See ‘Em, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2005), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/06/opinion/06schwartz.html. 
 13. MONTESQUIEU, DE L’ESPRIT DES LOIS 305 (1834). The English translation of this phrase 
is, “But the nation’s judges are, as we said, the mouth that pronounces the words of the law.”  
 14. In a brilliant and entertaining book, Professor Jay Wexler illustrates how even the 
apparently more unequivocal legal rules are subject to a certain degree of indeterminacy. Take, 
for instance, Article II, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution, providing that to be eligible for 
President of the United States you need to be at least thirty-five years of age. U.S. CONST. art. II, 
§ 1, cl. 4. Several scholars, in an effort to demonstrate that there is always room for legal 
interpretation, have attempted to argue that the provision does not really mean “thirty-five.” See 
JAY WEXLER, THE ODD CLAUSES: UNDERSTANDING THE CONSTITUTION THROUGH TEN OF ITS MOST 
CURIOUS PROVISIONS 81 (2011). Proponents of legal realism started arguing in the 1920s that 
judges were subject to political and personal preferences that the binding value of precedents 
could not curtail. See JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 148, 151 (reprinted 1936) 
(1930) (echoing a famous position expressed in OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES JR., THE COMMON LAW 
5 (1881)). A fundamental contribution in this field came in 1948 from C. Herman Pritchett, who 
noted the increasing use of dissenting opinions by Supreme Court Justices since the end of the 
1930s. C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT 25 (1948). One could argue that the 
mechanical view of decision-making could not be so obvious if different Justices could interpret 
the same provisions in sometimes radical and opposite ways. The debate juxtaposing textual 
interpretation as a mechanic activity to the desirability that judges also take into account other 
elements in disposing cases dates back to the German jurist Rudolph Ritter von Jhering (1818–
1892) and his critique of the Pandectists. See MARIO G. LOSANO, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW & 
SOCIETY: AMERICAN AND GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES 839 (David S. Clark ed., 2007), available at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781412952637.n380. 
 15. For an overview of critical legal studies, see MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL 
LEGAL STUDIES (1987). For a classical work on how politics affect judging, see DUNCAN 
KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (1997).  
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interpret and apply the law.16 Independently of how conscious and 
deliberate the influence of a judge’s personal “ideology” is on that 
judge’s decision-making, such an influence likely exists, at least to some 
degree.17 Americans tend to agree because in a recent poll, only one in 
                                                                                                                     
 16. See infra note 27; Section III.A. For an example of a work considering the role of 
religious beliefs on the selection of Justices, see Christine L. Nemacheck, Have Faith in Your 
Nominee? The Role of Candidate Religious Beliefs in Supreme Court Selection Politics, 56 DRAKE 
L. REV. 705, 705–06, 725 (2008) (arguing that “religion does not systematically affect a 
President’s selection of a candidate from the short list of potential nominees”); see also Donald 
R. Songer & Susan J. Tabrizi, The Religious Right in Court: The Decision Making of Christian 
Evangelicals in State Supreme Courts, 61 J. POL. 507, 507 (1999) (suggesting that evangelical 
Justices are more conservative than their religious counterparts). Other works take a 
complementary but distinctive perspective, arguing that policy preferences do not simply motivate 
judges in casting their votes, but that—in the light of those preferences—they vote strategically, 
taking into account the opinion and possible alliances on the panel deciding the case, the risk of 
being reversed, the chances that the legislature, the executive power or other governmental 
officers might act to nullify a judicial decision, the possibility of being reelected or promoted to a 
higher court, etc. For a discussion of strategic voting, which is not central to this Article, see LEE 
EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 10 (1998), and Pablo T. Spiller & Rafael 
Gely, Strategic Judicial Decision-Making, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLITICS 34, 
35 (Keith E. Whittington, R. Daniel Kelemen & Gregory A. Caldeira eds., 2008). Walter F. 
Murphy made the pioneering work in this area. See WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL 
STRATEGY (1964).  
 17. Feldman, supra note 11, at 28. Erwin Chemerinsky observes: “[W]e all share the 
perception that the Court is ‘objective’ and decides questions based on the law, separate from the 
ideologies of the justices. There is thus a sense that it is the ‘law,’ not the justices, that is 
responsible for the Court’s decisions. This is nonsense and has always been. The Court is made 
up of men, and now finally women, who inevitably base their decisions on their own values, 
views, and prejudices.” ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, THE CASE AGAINST THE SUPREME COURT 10 
(2014). Of course, at least for the Authors of this Article, this does not necessarily mean that 
Justices or judges improperly bend legal interpretation and precedents to achieve desired policy 
results. There is ample evidence of Justices going against positions that they have previously 
expressed, or the explicit will of the president who appointed them, out of respect for binding 
precedent. Two good anecdotal examples concern Miranda v. Arizona, 348 U.S. 436 (1966) and 
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000). The former was the famous case in which the 
Warren Court mandated police to provide suspects with warnings concerning the right to counsel 
during interrogation and the privilege against self-incrimination. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 498–99. 
As a reaction to the Miranda ruling, Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 3501, providing for the 
admissibility of voluntary statements made during an interrogation and when the Miranda warning 
is not given to suspects already in custody. 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (2012); JOHN PAUL STEVENS, FIVE 
CHIEFS: A SUPREME COURT MEMOIR 105 (2011). In 1980, the holding of the original 1966 Miranda 
decision was reaffirmed in Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980): Justice Potter Stewart 
wrote the majority opinion, joined by Justice Byron White, two dissenters in Miranda, and also 
by four appointees of President Nixon who opposed Miranda in his campaign. Id. at 302; 
STEVENS, supra, at 105. In Dickerson, Chief Justice William Rehnquist, who has often criticized 
Miranda, wrote the Court’s opinion confirming the decision, and also holding that § 3501 was 
unconstitutional (although he might have simply realized that there were not enough votes to 
overturn Miranda, and voted strategically). 530 U.S. 428, 432 (2000); STEVENS, supra, at 106. 
Another landmark decision, United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), shows the independence 
6
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eight respondents said that Justices decide cases solely on legal 
grounds.18 
Two prominent scholars that share this conviction are Judge Richard 
Posner19 and Professor Ronald Dworkin.20 Although disagreeing on 
almost everything else, particularly on the implications of this tenet,21 
both of these influential writers opine that judges’ ideological and 
political views influence them, especially Supreme Court Justices in 
“hard cases,” and that they should also decide cases on the basis of these 
views. Professor Lee Epstein is another author who has dedicated an 
impressive body of research to investigate (and largely demonstrate) the 
role of ideology in judicial decision-making.22 Most social scientists now 
easily concede that Justices and judges are policy seekers.23 This is true 
in legal systems that select judges through purely nonpolitical, technical 
exams that test candidates’ legal competency,24 and even truer and more 
apparent in systems like that of the United States in which the election or 
                                                                                                                     
of the Justices from the President: Warren Burger, named Chief Justice by President Nixon, wrote 
the opinion holding that President Nixon had to produce the tape recordings that led to his 
resignation. Id. at 714; STEVENS, supra, at 113–14. Investigating—and even finding—a statistical 
correlation between the Justices’ ideologies and their ruling does not in any way imply, at least in 
our perspective, that the Justices do not respect the law and stare decisis, but more simply that 
when there are objective ambiguities in the rules that need to be applied, and there is room for 
interpretation, Justices, as all human beings, are (also) influenced by their view of the world. 
Similarly, using the political affiliation of the appointing president as a proxy for the Justices’ 
policy preferences in no way implies a subservient attitude toward the president or his party, but 
is simply a way to easily code the likely position of the Justice on the political spectrum, at least 
at the time of the nomination.  
 18. Adam Liptak & Allison Kopicki, Approval Rating for Justices Hits Just 44% in New 
Poll, N.Y. TIMES (June 7, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/08/us/politics/44-percent-of-
americans-approve-of-supreme-court-in-new-poll.html.  
 19. See RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 331–32 (2003); Richard 
A. Posner, Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31, 39 (2005). 
 20. See RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES 19 (2006).  
 21. For a discussion of the positions of Posner and Dworkin, see Feldman, supra note 11, 
at 18. 
 22. Among the vast scholarship of Epstein, in addition to the contributions cited throughout 
this Article, it is sufficient here to refer to two works: EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 16, at 10, 
and LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL 
JUDGES 2–3 (2013). 
 23. See EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 16, at 23. 
 24. This is the case in France, Italy, and Germany. For some comparative perspectives on 
the recruitment of judges, see John Bell, Principles and Methods of Judicial Selection in France, 
61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1757, 1760–61 (1988); Daniel J. Meador, German Appellate Judges: Career 
Patterns and American-English Comparisons, 67 JUDICATURE 16, 20 (1983); T. Leigh Anenson, 
Note, For Whom the Bell Tolls . . . Judicial Selection by Election in Latin America, 4 SW. J.L. & 
TRADE AM. 261, 281–82 (1997). For a comparison of selection systems for the Supreme Court or 
constitutional courts of different jurisdictions, see Lee Epstein, Jack C. Knight Jr. & Olga 
Shvetsova, Comparing Judicial Selection Systems, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 7, 11 (2001).  
7
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appointment of the judiciary is an explicitly political process controlled 
by voters or politicians.25  
It is fairly easy to intuit that ideology somehow enters the analysis 
with respect to politically divisive issues such as abortion and procreative 
rights, sexual conduct, freedom of speech, separation of church and state, 
gun control, procedural protections for the accused in criminal cases, and 
governmental powers. Supreme Court Justices must often decide cases in 
light of an inevitably vague and old Constitution, framed in the very 
different sociopolitical context of the eighteenth century, which leaves 
latitude to different interpretations. Many studies have tackled the 
question of the relevance of the ideology of the Justices or appellate 
judges in these situations, often finding a correlation between policy 
preferences and decisions.26  
This Article fills a gap in the existing literature on the correlation 
between ideology and judicial decision-making in the highly technical 
area of securities regulation.27 Since the enactment of the securities laws 
                                                                                                                     
 25. See infra Section I.A.  
 26. See infra Section II.B. The existing empirical literature on the functioning of the courts, 
and of the Supreme Court in particular, is very vast. See Michael Heise, The Past, Present, and 
Future of Empirical Legal Scholarship: Judicial Decision Making and the New Empiricism, 2002 
U. ILL. L. REV. 819, 820. An excellent bibliography of the most important contributions is 
indicated in EPSTEIN, LANDES & POSNER, supra note 22, at 89–99. Other reviews of the literature 
are offered by Frank B. Cross, What Do Judges Want?, 87 TEX. L. REV. 183, 184, 232–33 (2008) 
(reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK (2008)) and Gregory C. Sisk, The 
Quantitative Moment and the Qualitative Opportunity: Legal Studies of Judicial Decision 
Making, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 873, 899–900 (2008) (reviewing FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION 
MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS (2007)). There are fewer cases on judicial behavior in 
foreign courts, but some are worth mentioning. See ASSAF MEYDANI, THE ISRAELI SUPREME 
COURT AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS REVOLUTION: COURTS AS AGENDA SETTERS (2011) (discussing 
the Israeli Supreme Court’s judicial behavior); Gila Stopler, The Israeli Supreme Court—Between 
Law and Politics, 48 TULSA L. REV. 257 (2012) (reviewing MEYDANI, supra); Shigenori Matsui, 
Why Is the Japanese Supreme Court So Conservative?, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1375 (2011) 
(discussing why the Japanese Supreme Court has developed such a “conservative constitutional 
jurisprudence”); Tokujin Matsudaira, Judicialization of Politics and the Japanese Supreme Court, 
88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1559 (2011) (providing an overview of “judicial conservativism in Japan”). 
A fascinating study on the German Constitutional Court indicates that the justices take into 
account the position of the Parliament and of the public opinion in their decisions. See GEORG 
VANBERG, THE POLITICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW IN GERMANY 121 (2005). 
 27. Some studies have investigated the correlation between Justices’ ideology and 
economic issues in general, see EPSTEIN, LANDES & POSNER, supra note 22, at 106–16, but no 
study specifically focuses on the regulation of financial markets. A recent work on the attitude of 
the Roberts Court toward securities litigation issues is A. C. Pritchard, Securities Law in the 
Roberts Court: Agenda or Indifference?, 37 J. CORP. L. 105 (2011). Pritchard argues that even if 
the Roberts Court has heard more securities cases than in the past, the Court is quite indifferent 
to the substance of the securities laws and their policies. Id. at 135. He also contends that the 
Roberts Court has not shown a “pro-business” attitude favoring corporate defendants, but rather 
a preference for the conservation of the status quo. Id. at 128. This work, however, does not apply 
8
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in the 1930s, the Supreme Court has decided a significant number of 
cases in this field. Even if the regulation of financial markets might seem 
less politically-charged than some of the issues mentioned above, this 
Article argues that there is meaningful room for political ideology and 
policy preferences in deciding these cases for a couple of reasons.  
First, and obviously with some simplification, this Article assumes 
that conservative-leaning people have a stronger belief in the efficiency 
of markets and their capacity to police themselves, as well as the 
desirability of deregulation. They are also less inclined to conclude that 
differences in bargaining power and information asymmetries between 
investors, on one hand, and issuers and financial institutions, on the other 
hand, require stronger protections for the former. This Article also 
assumes that more liberal Justices may put a stronger emphasis on market 
failures and the need to protect investors perceived as unable to fend for 
themselves, and they support more extensive government intervention in 
regulating the securities industry and enforcing the law. This simplified 
classification might need some qualification. For example, conservatives 
might be less sympathetic to procedural protections for people accused 
of criminal violations of the securities laws, such as insider trading. 
Overall, however, this Article proposes that this classification is a fair and 
reasonable hypothesis to test.  
Second, most securities regulation cases that come before the 
Supreme Court deal with the interpretation of the federal securities laws: 
statutes enacted approximately eighty years ago (even if often updated) 
that apply to one of the more rapidly evolving and innovative industries. 
Often the statutes are vague or ambiguous, leaving room for different 
interpretations. In fact, the Supreme Court often grants certiorari to 
resolve a split among circuit courts. In addition, several of the most 
important liability provisions designed to protect investors are implied 
private causes of actions (section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 for example), which are judge-created provisions that also present 
a certain degree of indeterminacy. In a limited number of cases, the 
Supreme Court has examined the constitutionality of a statute, in 
particular state antitakeover statutes. Even with respect to these problems, 
the Justices have few constraints on their interpretation activity. For these 
reasons, securities regulation cases represent an interesting opportunity 
                                                                                                                     
empirical analysis instruments. The present Article offers an additional perspective on these 
issues, not limited to the most recent years of the Court’s jurisprudence in the area of financial 
markets, largely based on an empirical analysis. Concentrating on the specific field of securities 
regulation allows for a more precise judgment on the policy preferences of the Justices vis-à-vis 
their overall political views. Aggregating votes in cases from a broad set of areas can in fact hide 
some information. For example, a Justice inclined to constrain government intervention in 
economic and social issues might, at the same time, be against tight regulation of financial markets 
and pro-choice on abortion.  
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to test the hypothesis of the influence of political ideology in judicial 
decision-making in a crucial area of the economy that no one has 
previously examined from this perspective.  
This Article is organized as follows: Part I offers a brief overview of 
the different systems used for the selection of the judiciary, focusing in 
particular on the appointment of Supreme Court Justices, but also 
considering other systems adopted for the states’ judiciary (including 
some comparative insights from other jurisdictions). This Article 
underlines the relevance of political considerations in the selection 
process, which could influence the ideology of selected Justices and 
judges. Part I also discusses more analytically the influence that judicial 
interpretation can have in the area of securities regulation. Part II contains 
an overview of the existing literature on the correlation between the 
ideology of Justices and judges and their positions on the bench. Part II 
also explains the most common measures of the elusive concept of 
“political ideology” used by social scholars.  
The core of this Article’s study, and its most important contribution, 
is Part III. Section III.A focuses on the methodological approach followed 
in collecting and coding the data used in this study, explaining issues such 
as the selection of the cases considered for the empirical analysis and the 
coding of the decisions and positions of the Justices on the political 
spectrum. Section III.B presents the major empirical results. The key 
question that this Article attempts to answer is the one anticipated in its 
title in a catchphrase: whether conservative Justices are more supportive 
of Wall Street and the free market, and liberal Justices more supportive 
of investors and regulated markets. 
In a recent book, Professor Erwin Chemerinsky observed that “the 
Supreme Court usually sides with big business and government power 
and fails to protect people’s rights. Now, and throughout American 
history, the Court has been far more likely to rule in favor of corporations 
than workers or consumers.”28 In the area of securities regulation, the 
distinction is not always as clear because what this Article defines as 
“investors” are often also large business enterprises. In addition, this 
Article’s empirical evidence shows a certain inclination to rule in favor 
of business, but also a significant degree of independence of single 
Justices who often vote in favor of investors. Professor Chemerinsky’s 
words, however, offer an interesting commentary on this Article’s 
findings. 
Sections III.B and III.C also use the data collected to explore other 
interesting inquiries. For example, Section III.B examines if and how the 
“pro-market” attitude of the Court correlates with the evolution of some 
general economic variables (i.e., if in times of economic growth and 
                                                                                                                     
 28. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, at 6.  
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bullish markets Justices tend to be more “free-marketers”). Section III.B 
also considers if Justices are more consistent in their decisions in this area 
when the Court is more divided. Section III.C explores which U.S. Courts 
of Appeals the Supreme Court most often overrules.  
I.  SELECTION OF JUSTICES AND JUDGES IN THE UNITED STATES 
AND IDEOLOGY IN THE SUPREME COURT’S SECURITIES 
REGULATION DECISIONS 
 This Part compares different approaches to the selection of members 
of the judiciary, primarily focusing on the distinction between politically-
based and merit-based selection processes. It then outlines the 
appointment process of Justices to the U.S. Supreme Court and the role 
that candidates’ ideologies play in this. Lastly, this Part examines the 
specific role that ideology plays in the area of securities regulation.  
A.  An Overview of Different Models for the Selection of the Judiciary 
There are many different possible ways to select judges. One major 
distinction, from a comparative perspective, is between systems in which 
the election or appointment is to some degree “political” (in the sense that 
either voters, elected legislatures, or executives play a role in the selection 
of the judiciary) and systems that are based solely or primarily on a 
technical examination of the legal knowledge of the candidates. Many 
different versions of these approaches exist, and the systems often present 
both “political” and “technical” elements.  
Many countries around the world follow the latter “technical” 
approach. This is the case in many civil-law continental European 
countries, such as France, Spain, Germany, and Italy.29 French judge 
Jean-Marc Baissus, interviewed by the New York Times a few years ago, 
said that the four-day written test to access the French judiciary “gives 
you nightmares for years afterwards.”30 It is usually rather young law-
                                                                                                                     
 29. For a comparative overview of some of these systems, see Luis Muñiz-Argüelles & 
Migdalia Fraticelli-Torres, Selection and Training of Judges in Spain, France, West Germany, 
and England, 8 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1 (1985); Mary L. Volcansek, Appointing Judges the 
European Way, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 363 (2007). In the United States, there is scant literature 
on the selection of judges and justices in other legal systems. Among the few works that offer 
some comparative perspectives, see Epstein, Knight Jr. & Shvetsova, supra note 24; more dated, 
but still-interesting short accounts can be read in Wolfgang H. Kraus, Book Review, 48 HARV. L. 
REV. 873 (1935) (reviewing R. C. K. ENSOR, COURTS AND JUDGES IN FRANCE, GERMANY, AND 
ENGLAND (1933)); and William H. Wynne, Book Review, 43 YALE L.J. 862 (1934) (same). 
Probably the best recent comparative analysis of different systems to elect judges is: APPOINTING 
JUDGES IN AN AGE OF JUDICIAL POWER: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES FROM AROUND THE WORLD (Kate 
Malleson & Peter H. Russell eds., 2006).  
 30. Adam Liptak, Rendering Justice, with One Eye on Re-Election, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 
2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/25/us/25exception.html. 
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school graduates intending to enter the judiciary just a few years after 
completing their JDs who take this exam.31 Ostensibly, in this case the 
selection of judges is less political: a judge’s future career often depends 
on other more senior judges and, to some extent, on members of the 
executive branch, such as the Minister of Justice.32 Even in systems 
where the selection of judges is accomplished purely through a technical 
exam, the election of members of the Constitutional Court is often 
different and more political.33 Italy is a good example. The President of 
the Republic elects one-third of the fifteen justices sitting on the 
Constitutional Court; the Parliament elects one-third; and other judges 
elect one-third.34  
Often in these systems—again Italy is an illustrative case—the 
Constitutional Court only decides issues concerning the constitutionality 
of statutes and is the only court with the power of constitutional review; 
if lower courts have doubts on the constitutionality of a law, they must 
submit a certified question to the Constitutional Court.35 In addition, 
specific requirements in terms of actual legal experience are frequently a 
condition for appointment on the Constitutional Court.36  
Justices and judges in the United States also have their nightmares, 
but they are of a different fabric than the ones of Judge Jean-Marc Baissus 
and his French colleagues. Even if different procedures for selecting state 
and federal judges coexist in the United States, they all share a significant 
political element: “To the rest of the world, the American adherence to 
judicial elections is as incomprehensible as our rejection of the metric 
system.”37  
Historically, after the American Revolution, the greatest concern in 
the colonies was to avoid the possible distortions of the English system 
in which an absolute monarch could single-handedly appoint and 
influence the judiciary.38 In the early years of the new nation, states 
generally opted for judges appointed by elected officials, namely either 
                                                                                                                     
 31. See Muñiz-Argüelles & Fraticelli-Torres, supra note 29, at 14.  
 32. See id. at 23 (noting that superiors rarely remove judges once they have been appointed). 
 33. Volcansek, supra note 29, at 367–68. 
 34. William J. Nardini, Passive Activism and the Limits of Judicial Self-Restraint: Lessons 
for America from the Italian Constitutional Court, 30 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 6 n.14 (1999). 
 35. See, e.g., id. at 6–8. 
 36. Epstein, Knight Jr. & Shvetsova, supra note 24, at 18. 
 37. Hans A. Linde, Elective Judges: Some Comparative Comments, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1995, 1996 (1988). For a short but witty historical account of the resistance to the adoption of the 
metric system in the United States also from a legal point of view, see WEXLER, supra note 14, at 
27–38. 
 38. Glenn R. Winters, Selection of Judges—An Historical Introduction, 44 TEX. L. REV. 
1081, 1081–82 (1966). 
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the legislature or the governor of the state.39 Some states, however, began 
to shift toward popular election of judges in the early nineteenth 
century.40 This shift was in part a result of the Populist Movement, which 
believed that the people had to elect all public officials and wanted to 
open the judiciary to a broader class of citizens.41  
After New York switched to election of judges in 1846, most states 
entering the Union had an electoral system.42 For obvious reasons, 
however, widespread dissatisfaction with popular elections developed, 
focusing especially on the lack of legal skills of the elected judges and 
possible episodes of corruption in the elections.43 Some states tried to 
limit the influence of politics on the judiciary by opting for a 
“nonpartisan-ballot system,” but soon enough this system also showed its 
limits.44  
In the 1930s and 1940s, some states began to adopt a version of the 
appointment system known as the “merit plan” articulated three decades 
earlier by Albert Kales, a professor at the Northwestern University 
School of Law.45 Under this approach, even if different variations exist, 
a nominating commission (generally composed of both lawyers and 
nonlawyers appointed by a variety of sources, such as the governor, the 
legislature, the judiciary, and bar associations, among others) provides a 
short list of candidates from among which the governor might choose the 
actual nominees.46  
These candidates are often subject to a “retention” election by popular 
vote after a limited term like one year in which the voters can choose if 
the judge can continue to hold the office.47 Nowadays approximately two-
thirds of the states have adopted a merit-selection system, even if it often 
coexists with other selection systems sometimes applied for lower 
courts.48 There is an extensive debate on the relative pros and cons of this 
                                                                                                                     
 39. Matthew Schneider, Why Merit Selection of State Court Judges Lacks Merit, 56 WAYNE 
L. REV. 609, 619 (2010); see also Winters, supra note 38, at 1082.  
 40. Winters, supra note 38, at 1082. 
 41. See id. For example, Georgia adopted election of judges for some lower courts in 1812, 
as did Mississippi in 1832. See id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 1083. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 1084–85. 
 46. Id. at 1084. 
 47. Id. 
 48. See Larry C. Berkson, Judicial Selection in the United States: A Special Report, 64 
JUDICATURE 176, 178 (1980) (noting that thirty-one states use commission plans, which assist the 
governor in selecting judges); see also Charles McElwee, Merit Selection of Judges, W. VA. LAW., 
Mar. 1995, at 21, 21; Schneider, supra note 39, at 624. See, e.g., generally Scott G. Hawkins, 
Perspective on Judicial Merit Retention in Florida, 64 FLA. L. REV 421 (2012) (describing the 
history of judicial merit retention elections in Florida and the issues related to that process). 
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system versus popular elections.49 
For Article III federal judges and Justices, on the other hand, the 
Constitution implements a regime of appointment by the President and 
confirmation by the Senate, and grants life tenure to the members of the 
federal judiciary.50 This system appears to share some features with the 
merit system, and we believe that it might be a de facto merit system 
because even if the President does not formally have to choose among a 
preselected list of qualified candidates, political pressure creates a strong 
incentive to appoint people with impeccable legal credentials, especially 
for the higher courts.  
All these different methods to appoint Justices and judges share a 
crucial element: they follow an inherently political process. In some 
instances the political element might be more explicit, but it is always 
present. It is inevitable that popular voters, executives, and legislatures—
all political actors—choose judicial candidates based on their ideology, 
expecting or at least hoping that their decisions on the bench will reflect 
their views as much as possible and contribute to advancing their political 
agenda.51 Ideology, in other words, has always played and will always 
play a significant role in the selection of the judiciary in the United 
States.52 If ideology plays a role in the selection of the judges, it may also 
play a role in their judicial decision-making.53  
Of course Supreme Court Justices, in light of life tenure and the 
prestige of the position, are among the most independent (and least 
accountable) existing public officers. Even if some nineteenth-century 
                                                                                                                     
 49. For a recent defense of the merit system, see Frank Sullivan Jr., Assuring Due Process 
Through Merit Selection of Judges, 46 IND. L. REV. 123 (2013). For a critique, see Schneider, 
supra note 39, at 660, who also questions the constitutionality of merit selection systems; see also 
Robert L. Brown, Selection of Judges, 64 ARK. L. REV. 71 (2011); Clifford W. Taylor, Merit 
Selection: Choosing Judges Based on Their Politics Under the Veil of a Disarming Name, 32 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 97 (2009).  
 50. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (containing the Appointment Clause); U.S. CONST. art. 
III (discussing life tenure). For a discussion of what judicial independence requires in addition to 
secure salary and tenure, see Gordon Bermant & Russell R. Wheeler, Federal Judges and the 
Judicial Branch: Their Independence and Accountability, 46 MERCER L. REV. 835 (1995); see 
also Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Reflections on the Independence, Good Behavior, and Workload of 
Federal Judges, 55 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (1983). Of course there are some federal judges appointed 
in different ways, and without life tenure: consider, for example, bankruptcy courts.  
 51. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Ideology and the Selection of Federal Judges, 36 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 619, 626 (2003). 
 52. See id. at 621 (arguing that “Presidents and Senates always have considered ideology 
in the judicial selection process,” and that “the consideration of ideology, by Presidents and 
Senates, is desirable”); see also Paul A. Freund, Appointment of Justices: Some Historical 
Perspectives, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1146, 1146 (1988) (arguing that “other dominant factors [in the 
judicial selection process] have shifted from sectional and party affiliations to social and judicial 
philosophy”).  
 53. See Chemerinsky, supra note 51, at 621.  
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Justices might have used, or tried to use, the Supreme Court as a stepping 
stone for further political ambitions;54 such behavior has been extremely 
rare in the last century.55 The very independence of Supreme Court 
Justices, however, in many ways allows them to more freely follow their 
personal convictions—often the very convictions for which the President 
selected them in the first place. Certainly those convictions can evolve or 
even change dramatically over time, something to consider in this 
analysis. However, the take-away point here is that the very systems used 
in the United States to select the members of the judiciary, and of the 
Supreme Court in particular, should reasonably be expected to inject a 
political and ideological element into the jurisprudence of the courts.  
B.  Supreme Court Appointments 
Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution provides that the President 
“shall nominate, and by and with the Advise and Consent of the Senate, 
shall appoint . . . Judges of the supreme Court.”56 More precisely, after 
the President has made a nomination, the Senate Judiciary Committee 
conducts hearings and either rejects or reports the nomination to the full 
Senate for a final confirmation vote.57 The procedure set forth in the 
Constitution was a last minute compromise at the Constitutional 
Convention.58 Initially, the framers intended to grant the legislature the 
power to elect Supreme Court Justices, and only in September 1787 was 
the current provision adopted.59 
Scholars widely debate the precise scope of the Senate’s powers under 
the “Advise and Consent” clause, and the Constitution does not offer 
much guidance on this issue.60 Some scholars, jurists, and politicians 
advocate a restrained role for the Senate, which should only include 
inquiring about the candidate’s credentials and her professional ethics, 
                                                                                                                     
 54. Consider, for example, the case of Justice John McLean (one of the two dissenters in 
Dredd Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 455 (1857), superseded by constitutional 
amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV) who, while on the Court, sought three different 
presidential nominations from three different parties, as reported by EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra 
note 16, at 38. 
 55. EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 16, at 39. 
 56. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 57. Orrin G. Hatch, At Last a Look at the Facts: The Truth About the Judicial Selection 
Process: Each Is Entitled to His Own Opinion, but Not to His Own Facts, 11 GEO. MASON L. REV. 
467, 473 (2003). 
 58. David A. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Senate, the Constitution, and the 
Confirmation Process, 101 YALE L.J. 1491, 1496 (1992). 
 59. Id. at 1496, 1498. 
 60. See generally Jeff Yates & William Gillespie, Supreme Court Power Play: Assessing 
the Appropriate Role of the Senate in the Confirmation Process, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1053 
(2001). 
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deferring to the judgment of the President; others argue the possibility 
and desirability of a more active and independent inquiry by the Senate, 
which should also consider the political and ideological views of the 
nominee.61 Should even the most restrictive opinion on the role of the 
Senate prevail, it would be very difficult to imagine its implementation62 
because the boundary between issues relating to a candidate’s 
professional credentials and his ideology is often blurred. The very 
existence of this debate, in any case, seems to confirm the political nature 
of the appointment process. In fact, depending on the convenience of the 
situation, both liberals and conservatives have argued for either one or 
the other approach.63  
Since the founding of the United States, the Senate has not been shy 
in using its veto power to block Justices due to their judicial ideology. As 
early as 1795, the Senate rejected President George Washington’s recess 
appointment of John Rutledge as Chief Justice primarily because 
Rutledge opposed the “Jay Treaty” with England approved by the 
Senate.64 According to some analysis, during the nineteenth century the 
Senate rejected twenty-one presidential nominations and, of these 
                                                                                                                     
 61. Id. at 1055–56. Proponents of a limited Senate role include Bruce Fein. Bruce Fein, 
Commentary, A Circumscribed Senate Confirmation Role, 102 HARV. L. REV. 672 (1989). 
Conversely, one advocate of a more active investigation is William G. Ross. See William G. Ross, 
The Questioning of Supreme Court Nominees at Senate Confirmation Hearings: Proposals for 
Accommodating the Needs of the Senate and Ameliorating the Fears of the Nominees, 62 TUL. L. 
REV. 109 (1987) (offering an extensive account of Senate confirmation hearings in the twentieth 
century and a classification of typical questions). Professor Donald E. Lively also favors an 
assertive role for the Senate. Donald E. Lively, The Supreme Court Appointment Process: In 
Search of Constitutional Roles and Responsibilities, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 551, 554 (1986) (favoring 
an assertive role for the Senate). Professor Bruce Ackerman defended the nomination of Robert 
Bork on the grounds of his professional qualifications, arguing that Bork should have been 
evaluated only in this respect. Bruce A. Ackerman, Transformative Appointments, 101 HARV. L. 
REV. 1164, 1164 (1988). Supreme Court nominees can elude senators’ questions in a number of 
ways, often by refusing to answer on the grounds that the issue could come up before the Court. 
Refusal to respond is actually grounded in 28 U.S.C. § 455, which provides that “[a]ny justice, 
judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which 
his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2012).  
 62. Yates & Gillespie, supra note 60, at 1067–68. 
 63. One additional indicator that the appointment process is highly political is the attempt 
by some presidents to sidestep the Senate through the controversial use of recess appointments, 
at least for lower federal judges. Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, for example, used 
this power. WEXLER, supra note 14, at 40, 46. However, the Senate rarely has the opportunity to 
inquire deeply into the nomination of lower federal judges in light of the growing number of 
judges. Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 58, at 1508 (noting that, in 1968, there were eighty-three 
court of appeals judges; in 1978, ninety-five; and in 1992, one hundred and fifty-four).  
 64. Lively, supra note 61, at 552.  
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rejections, at least seventeen were based on ideological preferences.65  
There are also twentieth-century examples of candidates rejected 
because of their political views. The Senate rejected John Parker in 1930 
largely because of his anti-labor and anti-civil rights positions.66 Forty 
years later, the Senate rejected two Nixon nominees, Clement 
Haynsworth and Harrold Carswell, based on their ideological positions 
regarding issues such as unions and civil rights.67 Similarly, in 1987 there 
was the famous case of Robert Bork, mentioned at the beginning of this 
Article.68 In some instances, the nomination was withdrawn due to 
filibustering.69 Sharp and sometimes bitter political divisions have often 
surrounded the nomination process, even when the Senate eventually 
approved nominees. Two symmetrical examples are the appointment by 
President Woodrow Wilson in 1916 of Justice Louis Brandeis, opposed 
by conservative and pro-business constituencies for his challenges to 
corporate practices and his favorable attitude toward laws protecting 
employees; and the appointment by President Herbert Hoover in 1930 of 
Charles Hughes, chastised by progressives and Democrats because 
people viewed him as a lawyer too closely associated with the interests 
of large corporations and utility companies.70  
Presidents are obviously well aware of the legacy they can create 
through a Supreme Court appointment and of how a carefully selected 
Justice can continue to project executive policies into the future, long 
after the presidents’ terms expire. The court-packing plan of President 
Franklin Roosevelt, aimed at protecting New Deal legislation from the 
prevailing laissez-faire doctrines of the early twentieth century, is a vivid 
illustration of this basic insight.71 President Richard Nixon provided 
another example by explicitly stating that his desire to shift the Court on 
criminal procedural issues motivated his appointment of Justices Warren 
Burger and Harry Blackmun.72 Several authors have expressed the 
                                                                                                                     
 65. Grover Rees III, Questions for Supreme Court Nominees at Confirmation Hearings: 
Excluding the Constitution, 17 GA. L. REV. 913, 944 (1983).  
 66. Chemerinsky, supra note 51, at 625. 
 67. Id.  
 68. Id.; supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text.  
 69. This was the case, for example, with the promotion of Abe Fortas to Chief Justice 
proposed by Lyndon Johnson, and of nominees Homer Thornberry and, more recently, Harriet 
Miers. Jeff Bleich, Advice and Dissent: The Role of Politics in the U.S. Supreme Court 
Appointments, OR. ST. B. BULL., Feb.–Mar. 2006, at 19, 19–21 (2006). 
 70. See Freund, supra note 52, at 1151, 1153.  
 71. See PETER IRONS, A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 313 (1999). 
 72. Conversation with Newsmen on the Nomination of the Chief Justice of the United States 
May 22, 1969, in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: RICHARD NIXON 396 
(1971) [hereinafter Conversation with Newsmen]; Herman Schwartz, Justice Blackmun, 43 AM. 
U. L. REV. 737, 739 (1994). 
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opinion that presidents have been generally successful in shaping the 
attitudes of the Court.73  
Of course the independence granted to Supreme Court Justices by life 
tenure and the prohibition of salary reductions allows some Justices to 
become “turn coats.” The result is that some appointments do not fulfill 
the expectations of the appointing president, but these cases, at least 
anecdotally, are quite rare. Probably the most prominent example is Chief 
Justice Earl Warren, whose ability to steer the Court toward liberal 
positions disappointed President Dwight Eisenhower so much that he 
supposedly defined his appointment as “the biggest damnfool mistake I 
ever made.”74 In more recent years, Justice Anthony Kennedy, as the 
swing vote on the Court, has attracted the ire of conservatives with some 
of his votes on gay rights and reproductive issues.75 Justices Harry 
Blackmun, Sandra Day O’Connor, and David Souter, among others, have 
also received similar criticism. The possibility that appointed Justices 
shift their position on the political spectrum during their tenure is an 
important element that this Article presents with its statistical analysis, 
and it suggests some caution in using their positions at the time of 
nomination as a proxy for their ideology.76  
The fact that very often in the recent past the party of the nominating 
president was different from the party controlling the Senate might 
explain the perception that the appointment of Justices has become 
                                                                                                                     
 73. E.g., Yates & Gillespie, supra note 60, at 1064; Lively, supra note 61, at 555. An 
interesting empirical study is Jeffrey A. Segal, Richard J. Timpone & Robert M. Howard, Buyer 
Beware?: Presidential Success Through Supreme Court Appointments, 53 POL. RES. Q. 557 
(2000), according to which presidents are generally successful in fostering their agenda through 
the Justices they put on the Court, but that over time the position of the Justices often tends to 
change from that of the appointing president. Id. at 557. Furthermore, presidents must sometimes 
compromise, so they might select a Justice who is expected to vote in a certain way on some 
relevant political issues, but might not be aligned with the appointing president on all issues that 
come before the Court. One example is Justice Blackmun, appointed by President Nixon also in 
light of his positions on criminal law issues, who however did not vote conservatively on abortion 
issues. Compare Conversation with Newsmen, supra note 72 (stating President Nixon’s hopes 
with regard to Justice Blackmun’s stance on criminal procedure issues), with Linda Greenhouse, 
The Supreme Court: The Legacy; Justice Blackmun’s Journey—From Moderate to a Liberal, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7 1994), http://www.nytimes.com/1994/04/07/us/supreme-court-legacy-
justice-blackmun-s-journey-moderate-liberal.html (discussing Justice Blackmun’s liberal stance 
on abortion). 
 74. The story is reported by several sources, with slightly different wording. See JOHN J. 
PATRICK, RICHARD M. PIOUS & DONALD A. RITCHIE, THE OXFORD GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT 690 (2d ed. 2001). 
 75. See Jeffrey Toobin, Swing Shift, THE NEW YORKER (Sept. 12, 2005), 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2005/09/12/swing-shift. 
 76. See infra Section II.A. 
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increasingly divisive and partisan.77  
Not only has the appointment process seemingly become more and 
more politically charged, but the internal functioning of the Court has 
also become more divisive. At least two meaningful pieces of evidence 
corroborate this perception. The first is the significant increase in the 
proportion of decisions containing at least one dissenting opinion since 
the 1930s, as clearly illustrated in the empirical literature.78 The second 
is the political polarization of judicial clerkships starting in the 1990s, as 
indicated in a fascinating study on Supreme Court clerks.79 
The appointment process of Supreme Court Justices has always been 
politically charged, and the perceived judicial ideology of the nominees 
                                                                                                                     
 77. See Chemerinsky, supra note 51, at 625–26. Moreover, as indicated by Professors 
David A. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, between 1969 and 1992 there were eleven consecutive 
appointments by Republican presidents, and in eight of these cases the Democratic party strongly 
controlled the Senate. Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 58, at 1493. 
 78. The following chart indicates the percentage of Supreme Court decisions containing at 
least one dissenting opinion from 1801 to 2009. LEE EPSTEIN, JEFFREY A. SEGAL, HAROLD J. 
SPAETH & THOMAS G. WALKER, THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS, AND 
DEVELOPMENTS 250–55 tbl.3-2 (5th ed. 2012) (containing data on dissenting opinions for the 
terms of the Court covering 1801–2009).  
 
It is worth noting that there is also evidence of significant disagreement in the nineteenth 
century in the private conference of the Court, but back then, the Justices were more reluctant to 
publish their dissent. EPSTEIN, LANDES & POSNER, supra note 22, at 67.  
 79. William E. Nelson, Harvey Rishikof, I. Scott Messinger & Michael Jo, The Liberal 
Tradition of the Supreme Court Clerkship: Its Rise, Fall, and Reincarnation?, 62 VAND. L. REV. 
1749, 1775 (2009); see also Adam Liptak, A Sign of Court’s Polarization: Choice of Clerks, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 7, 2010), http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D00E4DB1531F934A3 
575AC0A9669D8B63.  
19
Fedderke and Ventoruzzo: Do Conservative Judges Favor Wall Street? Ideology and the Suprem
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
1230 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67 
 
has always played a crucial role in their ascension to the highest Court. 
In the last few decades, the process seems to have become even more 
divisive, and the Court itself more polarized along political lines. Against 
this background, it is interesting to test if, in the area of financial markets 
regulation, conservative Justices have shown a pro-business inclination 
in their decisions.  
C.  Ideology in the Supreme Court’s Securities Regulation Decisions 
Probably the best evidence that political ideology can play a role in 
the area of securities regulation is the set of rules concerning the 
composition of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Section 
4(a) of the 1934 Exchange Act sets forth that the SEC should be 
composed of five members appointed by the President with the “advice 
and consent” of the Senate, but also requires that “[n]ot more than three 
of such commissioners shall be members of the same political party, and 
in making appointments members of different political parties shall be 
appointed alternately as may be practicable.”80 The statutory call for a 
bipartisan SEC indicates that regulation and enforcement activities 
concerning the financial markets can be subject to diverging philosophies 
along political lines.81  
It is obviously impossible here to fully discuss the general economic 
tenets of conservative and liberal policies with respect to the regulation 
of financial markets. General intuition, noted above, is that 
“conservative” views of economic policy emphasize the efficacy of 
markets over government intervention and regulation, while for liberals 
the position is reversed. The consequence is that conservatives tend 
toward deregulation based on the conviction that market failures rarely 
justify protections for perceived weaker parties in a private transaction. 
Liberals, on the other hand, are more skeptical about the virtues of free 
markets and believe that regulation should curb the possible inefficient 
                                                                                                                     
 80. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-281, 48 Stat. 881 (codified at 15 
U.S.C. § 78(d) (2012)). 
 81. See Dan Jamieson, A New Bipartisan SEC?, INVESTMENTNEWS (May 26, 2013, 3:31 
PM), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20130526/reg/305269978/a-new-bipartisan-sec 
(discussing the politics behind selecting candidates for the Commission).  
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and inequitable outcomes of laissez-faire market operation.82 In short, the 
former tend to be more “pro-business,” the latter more “pro-investor.”83  
An illustration of this possible political divide is the legislative history 
of the so-called Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.84 In the 
1990s, there was a growing concern that frivolous securities lawsuits 
could arise as attorney-driven class actions, in particular invoking section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act, forcing defendants to settle 
in light of the potential costs of discovery.85 Congress created this piece 
of legislation to curb such a phenomenon through different measures like 
raising the pleading standards.86  
In order to survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff had to plead false 
statements “with particularity,” and that pleading had to create a “strong 
inference” of scienter, one of the elements of a Rule 10b-5 cause of 
                                                                                                                     
 82. The literature supporting this assumption is so vast and well-known that it is neither 
possible nor necessary here to indicate a complete bibliography. A good in-depth discussion of 
how the ideas of Harold Laski (1893–1950), John Maynard Keynes (1883–1946), and Friedrik 
Hayek (1899–1992) contributed to shape respectively the left, center-left, and right economic 
beliefs in Western countries can be found in KENNETH R. HOOVER, ECONOMICS AS IDEOLOGY: 
KEYNES, LASKI, HAYEK, AND THE CREATION OF CONTEMPORARY POLITICS (Rowman & Littlefield 
2003). See also JAMES K. GALBRAITH, THE PREDATOR STATE: HOW CONSERVATIVES ABANDONED 
THE FREE MARKET AND WHY LIBERALS SHOULD TOO 50–53, 113, 120–21 (2008) (discussing the 
role that Keynes and Hayek had in the economic policies of many presidents in the latter half of 
the twentieth century); JAMES J. GOSLING & MARC EISNER, ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND AMERICAN 
PUBLIC POLICY 8, 11–12 (2d ed. 2013); JOHN A. ORR, ECONOMIC CONSERVATISM: AMERICAN 
POLITICAL IDEOLOGY (2013). More to the point of this Article’s focus, see, for example, Martin 
Gelter, The Pension System and the Rise of Shareholder Primacy, 43 SETON HALL L. REV. 909, 
949 (2013) (arguing that the current structure of pension funds has made middle-class Americans 
increasingly dependent on the capital gains market). 
 83. It is important to highlight again that “pro-business” and “pro-investor” are labels used 
to simplify the analysis. Perhaps one additional way to explain the different positions would be 
distinguishing between pro-free market and pro-regulation. We hold however (and the cases 
examined seem to confirm this intuition) that generally a position that broadens the scope of the 
regulation, extends private causes of action, and allows more extensive regulatory powers to the 
SEC is favorable to investors. In addition, increased regulation represents both a threat and an 
opportunity for business. For example, rules prescribing the use of certain environmental-friendly 
materials might be a cost for some firms, but a great opportunity for producers of those materials.  
 84. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 
(1995) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). For an account of the major 
innovations introduced and of the legislative history of the Act, see Jason L. Fowell, Comment, 
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 Writ for Certiorari, 44 S. TEX. L. REV. 809, 
815–17 (2003). See also generally Michael A. Perino, Did the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act Work?, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 913 (2003); Marc I. Steinberg, Symposium: Securities 
Laws After the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act—Unfinished Business, 50 SMU L. REV. 
9 (1996); and the other contributions published in that symposium issue of the Southern Methodist 
University Law Review.  
 85. See Perino, supra note 84, at 915; Fowell, supra note 84, at 809.  
 86. See Perino, supra note 84, at 915; Fowell, supra note 84, at 810. 
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action; in addition, the court granted a “stay of discovery” before the 
decision on the motion to dismiss.87 Congress enacted the bill into law 
over a veto by President Bill Clinton.88 Numerous Democratic 
representatives voted in favor of the law,89 but the diverging views of 
President Clinton and Congress evoke the traditional dividing line 
between liberals and conservatives in this area. 
This Section briefly addresses the room for policy consideration—
politics—in the enforcement of the securities laws. The intent is not to 
offer a comprehensive account of the degree of freedom that courts have 
in the interpretation of all the provisions of the securities laws, but more 
simply to give a flavor of the possible different interpretations of the 
relevant statutes that a particular set of beliefs concerning the proper 
scope of the regulation might influence.  
To begin, note that the U.S. securities laws enacted in the 1930s were 
among the first modern regulations of the financial industry, and they 
have served as a model for several foreign jurisdictions.90 These laws, 
however, apply to one of the most dynamic and innovative industries. 
Inevitably, enforcing the existing rules to the ever-evolving factual 
circumstances that characterize this sector leaves wiggle room for 
different policy considerations.  
A good starting point is the scope of the securities laws. The definition 
of “security” that triggers the obligation to register and disclose 
information, as well as the availability of specific private causes of action 
designed to protect investors, is broad but also vague. For example, 
consider the notion of what constitutes an “investment contract” set forth 
                                                                                                                     
 87. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)(A), (b)(3) (2012). 
 88. Fowell, supra note 84, at 819. 
 89. Ann Morales Olazábal, False Forward-Looking Statements and the PLSRA’s Safe 
Harbor, 86 IND. L.J. 595, 616 n.79 (2011) (noting that eighty-nine House Democrats and twenty 
Senate Democrats voted to override President Clinton’s veto). 
 90. See Roberta S. Karmel, The EU Challenge to the SEC, 31 FORDHAM INT’L L J. 1692, 
1711 (2008) (arguing that “[s]ince the SEC has served as the gold standard of securities regulation, 
it is not surprising that as the EU has striven to improve and integrate European capital markets, 
it has looked to U.S. securities litigation as a model,” but also observing that recent economic 
developments, and the growth of the financial markets in London, now give more power to the 
European Union to influence the SEC); see also Stephen J. Choi, The Evidence on Securities Class 
Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1465, 1508 (2004) (mentioning that Korea has looked to the U.S. 
model to regulate its securities markets). But consider also what has been correctly pointed out by 
David He, Note, Beyond Securities Fraud: The Territorial Reach of U.S. Laws After Morrison v. 
N.A.B., 2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 148, 204: “U.S. securities laws--and especially the antifraud 
provisions under Section 10(b)--are viewed by many nations as exceedingly intrusive and 
burdensome, and numerous governments have openly rejected the U.S. private securities class-
action model.”  
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in section 2 of the Securities Act (and section 3 of the Exchange Act) that 
the Supreme Court had to define on various occasions.91  
Another crucial area concerns the availability of private causes of 
action to plaintiff-investors allegedly harmed by false, misleading, or 
incomplete statements in the purchase or sale of securities and the burden 
of proof that they must satisfy to prevail.92 Furthermore, in several cases, 
the remedies granted to plaintiffs are based on private causes of action 
implied by the courts and not explicitly regulated by the legislature, most 
notably section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act. In these 
instances, significant interpretative latitude exists. Consider, for example, 
problems such as the need to prove reliance vis-à-vis the fraud-on-the-
market theory, the scienter requirement, or the extension of liability to 
aiders and abettors.93 The extension of the insider-trading prohibition, a 
rule largely created by courts, is another area in which different 
ideological perspectives might affect the decision-making process.94  
Conservatives and liberals also often have divergent views about the 
powers of the government (i.e., the SEC) to enforce the law, particularly 
the securities laws. For example, some interesting cases in this respect 
deal with the burden of proof that the SEC must satisfy to establish a 
violation of the securities laws.95 
Rulings on takeover regulation also might indicate different policy 
preferences of the Justices. These cases, however, show the difficulty of 
properly coding certain decisions as pro-business or pro-investor, a 
                                                                                                                     
 91. Leading cases on this issue are SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 391, 395, 397 (2004); 
Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 685–87, 697 (1985); International Brotherhood. 
of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 556, 558 (1979); United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. 
Foreman, 421 U.S. 837, 847, 851–52, 859–60 (1975); SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 
297, 301 (1946).  
 92. See, e.g., Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 564, 567, 584 (1995) (discussing the 
private cause of action given to plaintiffs when there are misstatements or omissions in a 
prospectus and denying that right of action to plaintiffs because recitations in a purchase 
agreement did not equate to a prospectus); Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 632–33 (1988) 
(discussing the use of the in pari delicto defense in a private right of action under the federal 
securities laws). 
 93. Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 177 (1994) 
(discussing aiding and abetting liability); Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 245–47 (1988) 
(discussing the fraud-on-the-market theory); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 
(1976) (discussing the scienter requirement); Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 
U.S. 128, 150–53 (1972) (discussing fraud-on-the-market). 
 94. See, e.g., United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652–54 (1997) (describing a broad 
understanding of what constitutes fraud); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 658–60 (1983) (limiting 
the scope of liability for insider trading); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 229, 232–33 
(1980) (discussing the common law and declining to broaden insider trading liability). 
 95. E.g., Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 697 (1980) (holding that the SEC has the burden of 
proving scienter in certain civil enforcement actions but not others).  
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problem that more generally affects the analysis undertaken later in this 
Article.96 On one hand, it is possible to argue that takeovers, and more 
specifically hostile tender offers, favor investors by allowing them to sell 
their shares at a premium over market prices. On the other hand, some 
tender offers may not be value-maximizing, and in this case to allow the 
target corporation, as well as its controlling shareholders and managers, 
to resist an inadequate or coercive offer could be in the best interest of 
shareholders.  
In any case, the proper role of the market for corporate control and 
how to create a level playing field for bidders and targets in the takeover 
context are also areas where there is room for competing policy 
considerations.97 In addition, litigation concerning the constitutionality of 
state antitakeover statutes is instructive as to the position of the Supreme 
Court on issues relating to the relative powers of the federal government 
and the states in regulating commerce, an area that implicates the 
politically charged question of the role of the federal government.98 
The legislature resolved some of the controversies mentioned above, 
and the Court unanimously finds this easy solution. Even assuming that 
ideological preference might be embedded in their decision-making, 
judges and, to a lesser but not unsubstantial extent, Supreme Court 
Justices face several constraints while speaking from the bench: 
Sometimes statutes and regulations are fairly straightforward and do not 
leave room for policy considerations; Lower judges might desire not to 
be reversed on appeal;99 Fear of “government retaliation” might play a 
role (in the sense, for example, that striking down a statute might lead the 
legislature to introduce other measures that the Justice opposes); And 
public opinion might unconsciously influence them.  
There are, however, several “hard cases” where the solution does not 
seem to appear in either the Constitution or in statutory or case law. These 
hard cases leave room for the different policy approaches of the decision 
maker, as also indicated by the practice of dissenting opinions. This 
Article proposes that by examining a significant number of cases, it is 
                                                                                                                     
 96. See infra Section III.A; see also supra note 83. 
 97. See, e.g., Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 8–9, 11–12 (1985) (relying on 
the legislative history and purpose of the Williams Act to limit its application); Piper v. Chris-
Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 26–30 (1977) (looking at the legislative history and purposes of the 
Williams Act to determine that shareholders are the intended beneficiaries of the Act); Rondeau 
v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 57–59 (1975) (discussing the purpose of antitakeover 
provisions in the Williams Act).  
 98. E.g., CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 94 (1987); Edgar v. MITE 
Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 643–46 (1982).  
 99. Of course this element is irrelevant for Supreme Court decisions. As was famously 
remarked by Justice Robert Jackson, “We are not final because we are infallible . . . we are 
infallible only because we are final.” Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., 
concurring).  
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possible to detect economic policies preferred by the Justices. In short, 
there are problems in the area of securities regulation in which ideology 
can play a role, considering the indeterminacy of the applicable laws.  
II.  AN OVERVIEW OF EXISTING LITERATURE ON THE ROLE OF IDEOLOGY 
IN JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING 
 This Part begins by discussing the different ways to measure the 
elusive concept of ideology. Then, after considering the ideology of the 
Justices, this Part explores the correlation between that Justices’ ideology 
and the way they vote on different decisions. 
A.  Measures of Justices’ Ideology 
One of the interesting and challenging problems of any study that 
investigates the correlation between the “ideology” of Supreme Court 
Justices and their voting patterns is how to precisely code such an 
ambiguous and elusive concept as the ideology of each Justice. There are 
three major techniques used in the political and legal literature to attribute 
a position to Justices (and lower court judges) on the political spectrum: 
(1) the party of the appointing president; (2) the Segal–Cover scores; and 
the (3) Martin–Quinn scores. The first two are “ex ante” measures 
because they classify the Justices based on proxies for their ideology 
measured before their tenure on the bench, and they remain static for the 
entire period the Justices work on the Court. The last one is an “ex post” 
measure, ranking Justices from liberal to conservative based on their 
actual voting in published opinions. 
The party of the appointing president is probably the most common 
measure used to code the political affiliation of Justices. This measure is 
based on the assumption that Republican presidents will appoint 
conservative Justices and Democratic ones will appoint liberal Justices. 
It has several advantages: “it is unambiguous, . . . easy to [apply and] 
understand.”100 It also raises a separate issue: to what extent presidents 
are able to effectively influence the activity of the Court. 
This measure, however, also has some clear drawbacks. The first 
drawback is that, as with all ex ante measures, the measure is static and 
does not take into account the possibility (indeed, the likelihood) that 
some Justices might change their ideological position during their often 
long tenure, as mentioned above.101 In fact, empirical literature suggests 
                                                                                                                     
 100. EPSTEIN, LANDES & POSNER, supra note 22, at 74. 
 101. See supra text accompanying notes 74–76. 
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that most Justices “drift” in their position on the ideological spectrum 
throughout their years on the bench.102 
This variable is also problematic because it assumes that all 
Republican presidents are conservative and that all Democratic ones are 
liberal, or at least that they are all conservative or liberal in the same way, 
which is clearly not true. An interesting study ranked the U.S. presidents 
from Franklin Roosevelt to Bill Clinton based on their social and 
economic liberalism.103 The ranking is based on a 1995 survey of a 
random group of political scientists, and the results—used in this 
Article’s empirical analysis—are as follows (100 being extremely liberal 
and 0 extremely conservative):  
 
In addition, not all presidents want or can appoint a Justice who 
precisely mirrors their views.104 Other considerations might affect the 
decision, such as the need to take into account the geographical origins 
of the candidate and—especially in more recent years—the need to create 
                                                                                                                     
 102. Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, Kevin Quinn & Jeffrey A. Segal, Ideological Drift 
Among Supreme Court Justices: Who, When, and How Important?, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1483, 
1485–86 (2007); see also Segal, Timpone & Howard, supra note 73, at 567, 569.  
 103. Segal, Timpone & Howard, supra note 73, at 560. 
 104. Consider the case of William H. Taft (1857–1930), a Republican, who, besides being 
the only person who served as both President and Chief Justice, was a president who appointed 
three Democrats to the Supreme Court. See IRONS, supra note 71, at 261. They were southern 
conservatives with which President William Taft had a better relationship than with the 
progressives within his own party. Id. 
Figure 1: Ranking of U.S. Presidents 
(Segal, Timpone & Howard, 2000)
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a diverse Court in terms of gender and race to appeal to part of the 
electorate (consider President Ronald Reagan’s appointment of Justice 
Sandra Day O’Connor or President Barack Obama’s appointment of 
Justice Sonia Sotomayor). Political and party necessities can influence 
the President: for example, senators can play a role in the selection, 
especially the senator of the same party as the President from the state of 
the nominee, though this is more likely to occur in the selection process 
for the lower federal courts and is probably less relevant in Supreme 
Court nominations. Finally, the President can make a mistake in assessing 
the position of the appointee on the political spectrum,105 or simply may 
not care so much. Notwithstanding these caveats, this Article uses the 
party of the appointing president as one proxy for the ideology of the 
Justices, for the reasons indicated above.  
A second very common measure for the ideology of Supreme Court 
Justices is the so-called Segal–Cover index.106 This is also an ex ante 
measure that ranks Justices on a conservative-to-liberal spectrum based 
on a content analysis of editorials published in two liberal and two 
conservative newspapers about the nominees in the period from their 
nomination to their confirmation.107 In its original formulation, to 
determine the Segal–Cover index, each paragraph of an article receives a 
score: +1 if it indicates a liberal attitude of the candidate, 0 if a moderate 
one, or -1 if a conservative one. The position of the Justice is measured 
according to the following formula: 
 
 
In the above formula, “l” is the number of paragraphs indicating a 
liberal ideology, “c” is the number of paragraphs indicating a 
conservative ideology, and “total” is the total number of paragraphs. 
Results can vary between -1 (extremely conservative) and +1 (extremely 
                                                                                                                     
 105. For a description of these possible mistakes of the ideology classification based on the 
party of the appointing president, see EPSTEIN, LANDES & POSNER, supra note 22, at 71. 
 106. Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme 
Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 557, 559 (1989) [hereinafter Ideological Values]; Jeffrey 
A. Segal, Lee Epstein, Charles M. Cameron, Harold J. Spaeth, Ideological Values and the Votes 
of U.S. Supreme Court Justices Revisited, 57 J. POL. 812, 813 (1995) [hereinafter Ideological 
Values Revisited].  
 107. Ideological Values, supra note 106, at 559; Ideological Values Revisited, supra note 
106, at 813. 
total
cl 
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liberal). In line with other studies, this Article has renormalized the score 
from 0 (conservative) to 1 (liberal).108 
However, the Segal–Cover index is not devoid of shortcomings. Like 
the Republican/Democratic appointing president variable, the Segal–
Cover index is static and does not consider changes in the Justice’s 
attitudes. A specific bias of this index is that the policies and preferences 
of the newspaper influence op-ed pieces on prospective Justices. For 
example, there are certain issues that might receive more emphasis than 
others, e.g., social issues versus economic ones. In addition, the 
newspaper can influence the length of the article and therefore affect the 
balance between paragraphs emphasizing a conservative or a liberal 
inclination.109  
This methodology does not take into account other possible important 
sources that indicate the ideology of a Justice, from scholarly articles to 
books published before the nomination.110 Professors Lee Epstein, 
William Landes, and Richard Posner have created a more comprehensive 
index that also considers these elements, but this Article does not use it 
in this analysis.111 
Another possible bias of the Segal–Cover index is that, in the period 
between nomination and confirmation, the authors of the editorials might 
write “strategically”—trying to make a candidate appear more liberal and 
less self-restrained to enrage Republican Senators, for example. The 
Segal–Cover index is, however, popular in the literature, and it has the 
advantage of comporting with general scholarly evaluations of the 
Justices.112 In addition, unlike the party of the appointing president, the 
Segal–Cover index ranks the Justices on a continuous scale from -1 to +1 
(or from 0 to +1), offering a more nuanced measure of the position of the 
Justices and allowing for more precise correlations.  
The most important ex post proxy of the ideology of the Justices is the 
Martin–Quinn index.113 It is based on a classification of the actual votes 
                                                                                                                     
 108. The normalized measure is that provided in Jeffrey Segal & Albert Cover, Perceived 
Qualifications and Ideology of Supreme Court Nominees 1937–2012, STONY BROOK U., 
http://www.stonybrook.edu/commcms/polisci/jsegal/QualTable.pdf (last visited May 1, 2015), 
and given by L=1-(C/T), 0≤L≤1, where C denotes the paragraphs coded as indicating that the 
nominee is liberal, and T, the total number of paragraphs devoted to the Justice. Ideological 
Values, supra note 106, at 560 tbl.10. 
 109. See EPSTEIN, LANDES & POSNER, supra note 22, at 73. 
 110. Id. at 73–74. 
 111. Id. at 205. 
 112. Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, Kevin M. Quinn & Jeffrey A. Segal, Ideology and the 
Study of Judicial Behavior, in IDEOLOGY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND LAW 705, 709–10 (Jon Hanson ed., 
2012). 
 113. Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov 
Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953–1999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS 134, 135 n.1, 145 
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of the Justices during their terms, adjusted to take into account possible 
alignments among Justices, and it returns an “ideal point” representing a 
Justice’s ideology in a space ranging from very liberal (-6.656) to very 
conservative (3.884).114 This proxy is useful because it accurately 
positions the Justices’ ideology in different terms and therefore does not 
suffer from the static nature of ex ante measures.  
The major problem with this approach is its circularity or endogeneity. 
Arguably, this measure only shows that a Justice who usually votes 
conservative is more likely to vote conservative; it does not provide any 
information on the cases in which a Justice, perceived as liberal at the 
time of her appointment, voted more conservatively than expected.115 
Removing cases on the particular issue researched and evaluating the 
correlation between the votes cast in other cases and those the research 
focuses on can partially mitigate this problem. For example, if one 
intends to test how Justices vote on First Amendment issues, one can 
factor in the votes cast in cases not dealing with First Amendment claims 
and verify if these votes predict how Justices will vote on First 
Amendment controversies.  
This Article’s analysis of securities regulation decisions uses all these 
variables (the party of the appointing president, economic liberalism of 
the appointing president, Segal–Cover scores, and Martin–Quinn scores) 
to test the existence of a correlation between Justices’ ideologies and their 
voting behavior. Combining the most commonly used measures will offer 
important and interesting insights on this Article’s query.116 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
(2002) [hereinafter Dynamic Estimation]. See generally Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, 
Can Ideal Point Estimates Be Used as Explanatory Variables? (Oct. 8, 2005) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://mqscores.berkeley.edu/media/resnote.pdf.  
 114. See Dynamic Estimation, supra note 113, at 145. Professor Corey Yung elaborated on 
an adjusted variant of the Martin–Quinn index for court of appeals judges. See Corey Rayburn 
Yung, Judged by the Company You Keep: An Empirical Study of the Ideologies of Judges on the 
United States Courts of Appeals, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1133 (2010). 
 115. EPSTEIN, LANDES & POSNER, supra note 22, at 75–76. 
 116. A final observation is that other elements besides the “political position” of the judge 
or Justice can play a relevant role in her judicial attitude. For example, Professor and Judge Guido 
Calabresi indicated that previous professional experiences might be more relevant than other 
considerations: looking at the reversals of criminal convictions by judges of the Second Circuit, 
he pointed out how judges who reversed least had come to the bench from the U.S. Attorney’s 
Office, while judges coming from private practice or academia before appointment reversed more 
criminal convictions. Background, sometimes, can trump ideology. Email from Guido Calabresi, 
Senior Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, to Authors (Nov. 12, 2013, 5:51 PM) 
(on file with authors). 
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B.  Studies on the Correlation Between Ideology (and Other 
Factors) and Decisions 
As examined above, the empirical literature of judicial behavior is 
vast.117 It would be difficult to provide here a complete account of the 
numerous studies published by political scientists and legal scholars in 
this broad area. This Article therefore limits its overview to some select 
works, pointing out in particular how the studies generally indicate a 
correlation between the ideology of Justices and judges and the way they 
vote.118 
One of the forerunners of empirical legal studies in this area was 
Professor C. Herman Pritchett, who in the 1940s started to keep track of 
the votes of the Supreme Court Justices, noting in particular the number 
of dissents and the allegiances among Justices sharing a political view.119 
The work of Professor Pritchett attracted a lot of interest as well as 
criticism, while several studies have confirmed his intuition that ideology 
plays a role in judicial behavior.  
The work of Professors Jeffrey Segal and Albert Cover offers a good 
illustration of the major results of this line of research. In their study, they 
find that ideology explains in a robust way (the correlation coefficient is 
0.80) the aggregate voting behavior of the Justices.120 
Many other studies indicate a relationship between the policy 
preferences of the Justices and their voting. Ideology might play a role in 
the very selection of cases that the Supreme Court will hear. Studies have 
found that liberal Justices tend to grant certiorari more often when the 
lower court rendered a conservative opinion, and vice versa for 
conservative Justices.121 This is particularly interesting considering that 
                                                                                                                     
 117. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 118. One excellent summary of the existing literature in this area can be found in EPSTEIN, 
LANDES & POSNER, supra note 22, at 76–79. The following pages draw much from the overview 
they provide. 
 119. C. Herman Pritchett, Divisions of Opinions Among Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court, 
1939–1941, 35 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 890, 891, 893–94 (1941). 
 120. Ideological Values, supra note 106, at 561. For an illustration of this work in the larger 
context of the studies on judicial behavior, see Jeffery A. Segal, Judicial Behavior, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLITICS 20, 26–27 (Keith E. Wittington, R. Daniel Kelemen & Gregory 
A. Caldeira eds., 2008). Of course statistics imply, by definition, some degree of simplification 
and synthesis. More analytical qualitative studies on the behavior of specific Justices often reveal 
a more complex picture, and not infrequently contradictory views and positions expressed by one 
Justice or judge. An interesting example of such a study is a 1973 article on Justice Douglas’s 
decisions in the area of taxation: Bernard Wolfman, Jonathan L. F. Silver & Marjorie A. Silver, 
The Behavior of Justice Douglas in Federal Tax Cases, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 235, 236–37 (1973). 
 121. See Saul Brenner & John F. Krol, Strategies in Certiorari Voting on the United States 
Supreme Court, 51 J. POL. 828, 828–29 (1989) (observing that numerous studies have determined 
that Justices sometimes engage in an “error correcting” strategy and will grant certiorari because 
they believe the court of appeals’ judgment was wrong); Gregory Caldeira & John Wright, 
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according to other studies, Justices want to hear cases they intend to 
reverse, and in fact empirical evidence indicates that between 1953 and 
1994 the Supreme Court reversed the majority of the decisions it 
reviewed (61.3 %).122 
Especially since the 1960s, conservative Justices have been 
proportionately voting to overturn more liberal precedents and strike 
down more liberal statutes, and the opposite is true for liberal Justices.123 
Other studies have shown an inclination of some Justices to vote for the 
defendants in criminal law cases if the litigation involves either statutory 
interpretation or Constitutional issues, which suggests coherence with a 
particular ideological view.124 
At least one empirical study has also examined the interpretative 
techniques employed by the Justices—in particular their use of legislative 
history. According to its authors, not only are liberal Justices more likely 
than conservative ones to use this interpretative technique, but Justices 
are more inclined to refer to legislative history “when it favors their 
ideologically preferred outcomes.”125  
Another line of research investigates the sensitivity of the Supreme 
Court to external pressures, whether real or perceived. While these 
studies do not examine the role of ideology in the Supreme Court’s 
decisions, they are relevant because they seem to confirm that Justices 
pay attention to extra-legal considerations, which might be a way that 
politics influence them. For example, one research study shows that when 
there is an ideological difference between the Court and Congress, the 
Court is less likely to invalidate a federal statute, which might be a 
concern for possible “retaliations” from Congress—either enacting a new 
statute with similar effects or other possible actions such as a reduction 
                                                                                                                     
Organized Interests and Agenda Setting in the U.S. Supreme Court, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1109, 
1112–14 (1988) (expanding on the idea that Justices are more likely to grant certiorari for a case 
they disagree with ideologically and asserting that amicus briefs help Justices determine when 
they disagree with a lower court decision for ideological reasons); see also Ryan J. Owens, The 
Separation of Powers and Supreme Court Agenda Setting, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 412, 424 n.26 
(2010) (observing that Justice White frequently dissented from the Court’s denials of certiorari 
because of ideological disagreements with the lower courts). 
 122. EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 16, at 27. 
 123. See Lori A. Ringhand, Judicial Activism: An Empirical Examination of Voting Behavior 
on the Rehnquist Natural Court, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 43, 45 (2007); Jeffrey A. Segal & Robert 
M. Howard, How Supreme Court Justices Respond to Litigant Requests to Overturn Precedent, 
85 JUDICATURE 148, 157 (2001).  
 124. See Ward Farnsworth, Signatures of Ideology: The Case of the Supreme Court’s 
Criminal Docket, 104 MICH. L. REV. 67, 96–98 (2005). 
 125. David S. Law & David Zaring, Law Versus Ideology: The Supreme Court and the Use 
of Legislative History, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1653, 1740 (2010). 
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of the Court’s budget.126 More generally, other works find that the 
Justices are responsive to changes in the public opinion.127 Even more 
central to the topic of this Article is the finding that the Supreme Court 
reacts to the business cycle, for example by siding with the government 
in times of economic growth and tending to rule against it during 
economic downturns, but deferring to government efforts in times of 
crisis.128 The instant empirical analysis has tested the hypothesis that 
Court decisions in securities regulation cases have some correlation with 
economic conditions.129 
Scholars have conducted extensive research on lower court decisions, 
focusing on decisions of the federal courts of appeals. Of course, the 
institutional context is different in such cases. Federal judges can face 
more constraints than Supreme Court Justices in their decision-making 
for reasons that this Article has already mentioned (fear of reversal, hopes 
of elevation to a higher court, etc.). It is important to note, however, that 
even with respect to lower federal judges, there are strong indicia that 
ideology affects judicial decision-making.  
For example, judges close to the Democratic Party vote more 
consistently against corporations in antitrust cases and for unions in labor 
disputes.130 An article on the Chevron doctrine claims that “panels 
controlled by Republicans were more likely to defer to conservative 
agency decisions (that is, to follow the Chevron doctrine) than were the 
panels controlled by Democrats.”131 Similarly, “Democrat-controlled 
panels were more likely to defer to liberal agency decisions than were 
those controlled by Republicans.”132 In addition, according to a study of 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, conservative Justices 
tend to align their votes with conservative judges, and liberal Justices and 
judges similarly align.133 
 
                                                                                                                     
 126. Jeffrey A. Segal, Chad Westerland & Stefanie A. Lindquist, Congress, the Supreme 
Court, and Judicial Review: Testing a Constitutional Separation of Powers Model, 55 AM. J. POL. 
SCI. 89, 90 (2011).  
 127. Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, Does Public Opinion Influence the Supreme Court? 
Possibly Yes (But We’re Not Sure Why), 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 263, 263 (2010).  
 128. Thomas Brennan, Lee Epstein & Nancy Staudt, Economic Trends and Judicial 
Outcomes: A Macrotheory of the Court, 58 DUKE L. J. 1191, 1196–97, 1219 (2009).  
 129. See infra Figure 7.  
 130. See Sheldon Goldman, Voting Behavior on the United States Courts of Appeals, 1961–
1964, 60 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 374, 376 tbl.1, 380 tbl.5 (1966). 
 131. Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Essay, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to 
Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155, 2175 
(1998). 
 132. Id. 
 133. MARVIN SCHICK, LEARNED HAND’S COURT 345–46 (1970).  
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There is also evidence of constraints on judicial behavior and of 
strategic voting. District court judges are adverse to reversal, or at least 
to a high frequency of reversals, and in their voting they seem to take into 
account the policy preferences of the court that will hear an appeal. On 
average, judges appointed by a Democratic president tend to impose 
lower prison sentences if a mostly liberal court of appeals reviews them 
and longer ones if the appellate judges are mostly Republican.134 Also, 
researchers have tested “panel effects”: male judges seem more likely to 
vote for women in employment discrimination disputes if a woman is on 
the panel,135 while white judges more frequently vote in favor of voting 
rights if a black judge sits on the panel.136 
Researchers have also conducted important studies on state judges, 
especially to investigate the behavior of elected judges. Elected judges 
rule more frequently in favor of in-state plaintiffs and against out-of-state 
businesses than appointed judges, especially when the decision transfers 
wealth to the state.137 Additionally, sentences in violent criminal cases 
are more severe if the judge is approaching reelection.138 Statistically, 
state supreme court justices are more likely to confirm death sentences 
when the electorate supports them.139 
This brief overview of some contributions indicates evidence that 
ideology informs judicial decisions and that judges take into account 
external variables like the panel composition, public opinion, Congress’s 
political composition, fear of reversal, and economic cycles. The results 
of previous research make interesting and relevant the questions that this 
empirical analysis investigates in the next Part, in particular whether the 
ideology of the Justices plays a role in securities regulation disputes.  
 
                                                                                                                     
 134. Max M. Schanzenbach & Emerson H. Tiller, Strategic Judging Under the U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines: Positive Political Theory and Evidence, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 24, 52–53 
(2007). See generally Kirk A. Randazzo, Strategic Anticipation and the Hierarchy of Justice in 
the U.S. District Courts, 36 AM. POL. RES. 669, 669 (2008) (discussing whether district courts are 
influenced by anticipated responses of courts of appeals).  
 135. Christina L. Boyd, Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, Untangling the Casual Effects of 
Sex on Judging, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 389, 390 (2010). 
 136. Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judging the Voting Rights Act, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 
1, 45 (2008).  
 137. Eric Helland & Alexander Tabarrok, The Effect of Electoral Institutions on Tort 
Awards, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 341, 367 (2002). 
 138. Gregory A. Huber & Sanford C. Gordon, Accountability and Coercion: Is Justice Blind 
When It Runs for Office?, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 247, 248 (2004).  
 139. See Melinda Gann Hall, Justices as Representatives: Elections and Judicial Politics in 
the American States, 23 AM. POL. Q. 485, 496–97 (1995); cf Richard R. W. Brooks & Steven 
Raphael, Life Terms or Death Sentences: The Uneasy Relationship Between Judicial Elections 
and Capital Punishment, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 609, 611–12, 637 (2002) (stating that 
trial judges are more likely to impose the death penalty in election years than in nonelection years).  
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III.  AN EMPIRICAL EVALUATION OF THE ROLE OF IDEOLOGY IN 
THE SUPREME COURT’S SECURITIES REGULATION DECISIONS 
 This Part discusses the empirical research that is the focus of this 
Article, including the methodologies used to collect the data. In addition 
to a general discussion of the methods and findings, it also analyzes the 
correlation between the ideology of Justices and their decision-making 
based on the data. Finally, this Part ends by considering the Justices rate 
of reversal of different cases depending on the court of appeals from 
which the case originates. This discussion paves the way for further 
research.  
A.  Methodological Issues: The Data 
This Section explains the major methodological underpinnings of the 
empirical research that follows. The table in the Appendix of this Article 
contains the most important data that we have used; hereinafter we 
discuss how we selected, collected, and coded that data. 
The first—and a most important—issue that we faced was the 
selection of cases. We selected forty-eight Supreme Court decisions, 
listed in the Appendix in alphabetical order by the name of the parties, 
from the 1930s through 2011—a time span that covers almost the entire 
existence of the securities laws. We did not select a random sample of 
cases but rather included what we consider the most significant cases 
decided by the Supreme Court in that period of time.140 From a statistical 
point of view, therefore, our response to the objection that we did not 
work on a random sample is that we considered the entire population of 
the most important decisions. Of course, to single out a decision as 
particularly important, and warranting of inclusion in our data, is a 
judgment call. Possible criticisms of our selection are that we neglected 
some other important decisions or that we included some cases that are 
not particularly relevant. Those criticisms are helpful to update this 
Article’s list of cases in the future. However, our selection seems at least 
partially validated by the generally significant number of citations to the 
selected cases,141 by the fact that major securities regulation casebooks 
include an excerpt or discussion of most of them,142 and leading treatises 
                                                                                                                     
 140. We had to exclude from the empirical analysis, however, Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1 
(1936), because some of the proxies for the Justices’ ideologies are not available for that year.  
 141. According to a search on Westlaw, courts have cited the cases in this Article’s data an 
average of 824 times per case, and legal journals have cited them an average of 590 times per 
case. 
 142. E.g., JOHN C. COFFEE JR. & HILLARY A. SALE, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND 
MATERIALS (12th ed. 2009); JAMES D. COX, ROBERT W. HILLMAN & DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, 
SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 1271–80 (3d ed. 2001); LARRY D. SODERQUIST 
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refer to them.143 We have also informally submitted the list of cases to 
several securities regulation scholars and experts who have confirmed 
that the selection covers the most important cases.144 We believe that 
focusing on the most relevant cases can lead to more useful insights on 
the issues this Article investigates. Even more importantly, we must note 
that even considering the most complete lists of securities regulation 
cases decided by the Supreme Court, depending on the database 
considered, our selection covers in between 75% and 94% of the total 
number of decisions. This makes the selection extremely significant and 
basically excludes possible bias.  
We did, however, include cases that resulted in a split Court or had 
some dissents as well as cases that were unanimously decided, contrary 
to other studies that only focus on decisions with some dissents, assuming 
that those are the “hard cases” that leave more room for judicial activism 
and are more politically divisive. We believe that ignoring unanimous 
decisions might cause a bias that tends to undervalue the situations in 
which all Justices share one interpretation independently of their political 
position when the law is less ambiguous.  
One objection to the analysis could be that we analyzed a limited 
number of cases. We have several responses to this criticism. First, as 
mentioned, we examined the entire (or almost) population of relevant 
cases. Second, forty-eight cases is a statistically significant number. Third 
and more importantly, the number of single observations is in fact 
significantly higher because for each case there were typically nine votes 
(sometimes slightly less if not all of the Justices participated in the 
decision).  
The table in the Appendix provides, after the citation and date, a very 
short holding of the case, often taken almost verbatim from the actual 
decision. This has sometimes raised a difficult issue because some cases 
have more than one holding, and the different holdings might not go in 
the same direction (for example, when they are not both pro-business). A 
good example is Basic Inc. v. Levinson,145 which ruled both on the 
                                                                                                                     
& THERESA A. GABALDON, SECURITIES REGULATION xxv–xxviii (6th ed. 2006); THOMAS LEE 
HAZEN, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS ix–xx (7th ed. 2006).  
 143. E.g., THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION (6th ed. 
2009); MARC I. STEINBERG, UNDERSTANDING SECURITIES LAW (5th ed. 2009); STEPHEN J. CHOI & 
A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND ANALYSIS (2d ed. 2008); LARRY D. 
SODERQUIST & THERESA A. GABALDON, SECURITIES LAW 205–07 (4th ed. 2011).  
 144. We have informally shared our list of cases with Professors Franklin A. Gevurtz, Joan 
MacLeod Heminway, Marc I. Steinberg, and Steven Thel, and they have all indicated that the list 
appears to include all the most important cases decided by the Supreme Court in the area of 
securities regulation (emails on file with the Authors). Obviously, their consideration of the list is 
just one additional element to validate it, but all errors and omissions are entirely ours. 
 145. 485 U.S. 224 (1988). 
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concept of materiality of information (adopting, in cases of merger 
negotiations, the “probability-magnitude” test and rejecting the 
“agreement-in-principle” test) and on the proof of reliance (adopting the 
“fraud-on-the-market” theory) in 10b-5 actions.146 In these limited cases, 
depending on the circumstances, we have either taken into account the 
different holdings or concentrated on the most important one by which 
the Court has affected the law, for instance in resolving a split among 
circuit courts, deciding an issue of first impression, or reversing or 
distinguishing from a precedent decision.  
The sixth column indicates our coding of the case as pro-business or 
pro-investor. This coding decision is extremely delicate. Generally 
speaking, we coded a decision as pro-business where the Court ruled in 
favor of the business defendant and against private investor-plaintiffs or 
the SEC. In most of the pro-investor decisions, the Court has interpreted 
broadly the scope of application of the securities laws, for example 
requiring the registration of a specific transaction (see SEC v. W. J. 
Howey Co.147). In other decisions, the Court has ruled in favor of 
investors on liability issues, for example implying a private cause of 
action (see J. I. Case Co. v. Borak,148 establishing a cause of action for 
misstatements in a proxy solicitation149), or it has eased the burden of 
proof for the plaintiff (consider again Basic, facilitating the proof of 
reliance150). The opposite is true for pro-business decisions. A recent 
example of a pro-business decision is Morrison v. National Australia 
Bank,151 which, excluding the extraterritorial application of the securities 
laws, has barred foreign-cubed securities class actions.152  
Some cases are either particularly difficult to code as pro-business or 
pro-investor or at least require adopting a controversial thesis (or some 
simplifying hypothesis, or both) to code them. This is particularly true in 
two areas: takeover regulations and insider trading. For example, the 
Court in one famous case held that a state antitakeover statute was 
constitutional because it did not violate the Commerce Clause and the 
                                                                                                                     
 146. Id. at 249–50. This second holding of Basic is an interesting example in terms of 
possible ideological underpinnings of the Court’s reasoning. The majority opinion uses a theory 
generally embraced by supporters of free markets to reach a result that is protective of investors. 
To simplify, by arguing that the efficiency of the market allows all publicly available information 
to be incorporated and reflected in market prices, it concludes that plaintiff-investors do not need 
to prove actual reliance on misstatements because in trading in securities they rely on market 
prices affected by the misstatement. Id. 
 147. 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946). 
 148. 377 U.S. 426 (1964). 
 149. Id. at 431–32.  
 150. Basic, 485 U.S. at 250. 
 151. 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010); id. at 2894 n.11 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 152. See id. at 2884–85, 2888 (majority opinion); id. at 2894 n.11 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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securities laws—specifically the Williams Act—did not preempt it.153 
Upholding antitakeover statutes might be pro-business if one subscribes 
to the idea that hostile tender offers tend to favor shareholders, allowing 
them to pocket a premium over market prices. On the other hand, some 
scholars argue that at least some antitakeover defenses can help 
management to fend off takeovers that are not value-maximizing, thereby 
allowing state legislatures to provide for stronger protections of the 
corporate bastion that can, at least in some situations, favor investors.154  
This Article generally takes the position that decisions favoring an 
active market for corporate control are favorable to investors, but some 
cases proved not to fit this conclusion. A good illustration is Piper v. 
Chris Craft Industries, Inc.,155 decided in 1977. In that case, the Court 
held that a defeated tender offeror has no private cause of action for 
damages against a competitive bidder and the target corporation for 
fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices in connection 
with a tender offer under section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934.156 We considered this case not favorable to investors because 
reducing protections for a competitive bidder might negatively affect the 
possibility of a price-maximizing auction among bidders. More 
generally, strict scrutiny of possible misstatements in the takeover context 
is at least indirectly beneficial to investors. We acknowledge, however, 
that there might be different interpretations of the effects of the decision. 
For example, one might argue that the decision favors investors because 
the target can escape liability, and therefore there is no payment of 
damages to third parties reducing the value of the target’s shares. 
Professor Harold J. Spaeth’s coding of the case as conservative supports 
our view.157  
                                                                                                                     
 153. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 94 (1987).  
 154. Classical works considering the effects of takeovers and discussing whether the market 
for corporate control should be facilitated are Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, The Case Against Board 
Veto in Corporate Takeovers, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 973, 975 (2002); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The 
Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1028, 1030 (1982); Lucian 
Arye Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, The Powerful Antitakeover Force of 
Staggered Boards: Further Findings and a Reply to Symposium Participants, 55 STAN. L. REV. 
885, 887 (2002); John C. Coffee Jr., The Bylaw Battlefield: Can Institutions Change the Outcome 
of Corporate Control Contests?, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 605, 607 (1997); Frank H. Easterbrook & 
Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 
94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1164 (1981); Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: 
The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 862 (1981); Ronald 
J. Gilson, Unocal Fifteen Years Later (And What We Can Do About It), 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 491, 
492 (2001); Jeffrey N. Gordon, “Just Say Never?” Poison Pills, Deadhand Pills, and Shareholder 
Adopted Bylaws: An Essay for Warren Buffet, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 511, 514 (1997); Martin 
Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target’s Boardroom, 35 BUS. LAW. 101, 105 (1979). 
 155. 430 U.S. 1 (1977).  
 156. Id. at 47. 
 157. Data, SUP. CT. DATABASE, http://scdb.wustl.edu/data.php (last visited May 1, 2015). 
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Insider trading cases might also be ambiguous because some scholars 
have famously argued that to allow some trading by insiders actually 
increases the information efficiency of the market.158 A delicate decision 
in this respect is Dirks v. SEC159 in which the Court denied insider-trading 
liability in a situation where the tipper acted with the goal of exposing a 
fraud and derived no personal gain from the tip.160 We have, however, 
generally followed the rationale that cases reducing the scope of 
application of insider trading favor business and that investors are better 
off with strict enforcement of the prohibition.161 For this reason, we have 
coded Dirks as a pro-business decision, and once again we find support 
in Professor Spaeth’s database, the Supreme Court Database that lists the 
decision as conservative.162  
Other cases present some element of ambiguity. One last example is 
a decision holding that predispute agreements to arbitrate controversies 
between investors and financial intermediaries are enforceable,163 a 
decision we coded as pro-business because, if nothing else, the investor 
was claiming that the arbitration clause was not enforceable.164 It is 
questionable that arbitration is less effective in protecting investors than 
litigation in federal courts, but this Article’s hypothesis is that leaving 
investors the choice of suing in court or arbitration is more favorable to 
them.  
It would be impossible to discuss all the cases in the list here. The 
general point this Article makes is that while most decisions are easy to 
classify as either pro-business or pro-investor, there are some 
controversial cases that required a judgment call on which reasonable 
minds can disagree. We are relatively confident, however, that our coding 
                                                                                                                     
 158. See, e.g., Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fishel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 
STAN. L. REV. 857, 861 (1983); Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading and the Law Professors, 23 
VAND. L. REV. 547, 565 (1970). Empirical studies, however, seem to indicate that insider trading 
does not significantly affect market prices. Joel Seligman, The Reformation of Federal Securities 
Law Concerning Nonpublic Information, 73 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1096 (1985). For a recent and 
comprehensive overview of insider trading regulation in the United States, and the underlying 
theories on which it is based, see WILLIAM K. S. WANG & MARC I. STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING 
(3d ed. 2010). 
 159. 463 U.S. 646 (1983). 
 160. Id. at 665–67.  
 161. See Laura Nyantung Beny, Do Insider Trading Laws Matter? Some Preliminary 
Comparative Evidence, 7 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 144, 144 (2005) (“[C]ountries with more 
prohibitive insider trading laws have . . . more accurate stock prices, and more liquid stock 
markets. These findings are generally robust to controlling for measures of disclosure and 
enforceability and suggest that formal insider trading laws (especially their deterrent components) 
matter to stock market development.”). 
 162. Data, supra note 157.  
 163. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 480 (1989).  
 164. Id. at 479.  
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is fairly accurate. Furthermore, even if the classification is debatable in a 
small number of cases, this should not significantly affect the results of 
the empirical analysis. 
One caveat is necessary: we have used the labels pro-investor and pro-
business because they convey the underlying idea of this Article’s 
analysis. A different expression, however, could be more accurate, such 
as “pro-regulation” and “anti-regulation.” In several cases, the plaintiff is 
itself a business organization, such as an investment fund or another 
corporation, and some decisions coded “pro-investor” might be favorable 
to particular kinds of businesses that can also be “investors.”165 
Notwithstanding this observation, the pro-investor/pro-business 
distinction captures in a brief and somehow catchy label the distinctions 
explained in this paragraph. Like all labels, however, one should not read 
this one too literally.  
The pro-business/pro-investor distinction often overlaps with the 
conservative/liberal one. For example, a position favoring the expansion 
of the powers of the federal government or judiciary vis-à-vis the states 
might be considered liberal but may actually favor business. Consider 
legislation limiting the ability of private plaintiffs to bring securities 
claims in state courts.166 As a control variable in our analysis, next to the 
column coding for pro-business or pro-investor in the table in the 
Appendix, we have indicated the coding of the decision as liberal or 
conservative based on the Supreme Court Database created by Professor 
Spaeth.167  
In the overwhelming majority of the cases, our classification of a 
decision as pro-investor coincides with the Supreme Court Database’s 
coding as liberal; similarly decisions we considered pro-business are 
usually deemed to be conservative in the Supreme Court Database, but 
there are some limited exceptions. One such case is Chiarella v. United 
States,168 a leading case in which the Supreme Court reversed a criminal 
conviction for an insider-trading violation, reasoning that the mere 
possession of nonpublic, price-sensitive information is not sufficient to 
                                                                                                                     
 165. In some pro-investor cases, the Court found in favor of a small investor against a large 
corporate defendant; however, in many cases the investor is a large financial institution or 
business entity. 
 166. We refer to the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, enacted to prevent 
the circumvention of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995; on this piece of 
legislation, see David M. Levine & Adam C. Pritchard, The Securities Litigation Uniform 
Standards Act of 1998: The Sun Sets on California’s Blue Sky Laws, 54 BUS. LAW. 1, 2–4 (1998) 
For a more recent evaluation of the effects of the statute, see Gregory Kendall, Comment, The 
Artful Dodgers: Securities Fraud, Artful Pleading, and Preemption of State Law Causes of Action 
Under the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 657, 657–58 (2012). 
 167. See Data, supra note 157. 
 168. 445 U.S. 222 (1980). 
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impose liability and that a breach of a fiduciary duty is also a necessary 
element of the violation.169 In other words, the holding in Chiarella 
rejected the “parity-of-information” theory of insider trading.170 This 
decision, favorable to a criminal defendant, has understandably been 
labeled liberal in the Supreme Court Database, but we find that limiting 
the scope of the insider trading liability can, at least generally, favor 
managers or employees who are insiders, hurt the general public of 
investors, and diminish their confidence in financial markets. We 
therefore treat some of these decisions as pro-business.171 Of course, this 
is yet another judgment call. We are in any case comforted by the fact 
that only seven cases involve discrepancies between our coding and 
Professor Spaeth’s.  
The Appendix contains the data described above for the reader’s 
convenience. To avoid making the Appendix too cumbersome, it does not 
include the data discussed below,172 which are easily obtainable from 
publicly available sources.  
For each decision, we have listed the Justices and indicated the three 
variables used to classify their ideology: the party of the appointing 
president, the Segal–Cover scores, and the Martin–Quinn scores. We 
have already discussed these measures and their pros and cons, and 
therefore do not need to further elaborate on those measures here.173 Note, 
however, that next to each president we have also indicated—when the 
data is available—their position on the conservative to liberal spectrum 
on economic issues according to the previously cited study by Professors 
Jeffrey Segal, Richard Timpone, and Robert Howard.174 We will use this 
measure to examine more precisely the possible connection between the 
economic policy preferences of the appointing presidents and the 
behavior of their appointees.  
For each Justice in each decision, we have indicated whether that 
Justice voted with the majority (taking either a pro-business or pro-
investor position), has dissented, or has not taken part in the decision. We 
have not distinguished between regular and special concurring 
                                                                                                                     
 169. Id. at 224, 226–28, 235; Donald C. Langevoort, Insider Trading and the Fiduciary 
Principle: A Post-Chiarella Restatement, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 17 n.68 (1982); Anthony Michael 
Sabino & Michael A. Sabino, From Chiarella to Cuban: The Continuing Evolution of the Law of 
Insider Trading, 16 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 673, 693–94, 718 (2011).  
 170. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235.  
 171. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.  
 172. See, e.g., Data, supra note 157 (containing data of the aforementioned Supreme Court 
Database); EPSTEIN, SEGAL, SPAETH & WALKER, supra note 78; MARTIN-QUINN SCORES, 
http://mqscores.berkeley.edu (last visited May 1, 2015). 
 173. See supra Section II.A. 
 174. Segal, Timpone & Howard, supra note 73, at 560. 
40
Florida Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 3 [2016], Art. 9
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol67/iss3/9
2015] IDEOLOGY AND THE SUPREME COURT’S SECURITIES REGULATION DECISIONS 1251 
 
opinions,175 but simply listed the votes as supporting the majority or 
plurality decision or dissenting from it based on data from the Supreme 
Court Database. While this choice disregards valuable information for a 
more in-depth legal analysis of the relevance of the decision and its 
binding value as precedent, considerations of simplicity in the empirical 
analysis prevailed.  
We then collected information concerning the Chief Justice to 
consider to what extent different Chief Justices were able to influence or 
steer the Court toward their positions or, more simply, under which Chief 
Justices the Court leaned more toward a pro-business or pro-investor 
agenda. The Chief Justice is a primus inter pares. He is the first one to 
speak at the Justices’ conference discussing the cases after oral argument 
and, if he is in the majority, he assigns the opinion. But besides that and 
his ability to persuade his colleagues, his vote has exactly the same value 
as the votes of the other Justices.  
Finally, we considered the circuit court from which the case arose and 
whether the Supreme Court reversed, affirmed, or vacated and remanded 
the case. The data are taken from the Supreme Court Database and 
Westlaw. This study focuses on Supreme Court Justices and therefore 
does not consider the ideological composition of the lower courts. It 
would be interesting, however, to confirm whether the Court reverses 
some circuits more often than others in securities disputes. Such a 
correlation might be a first step for future research into related questions. 
One such related question might be whether the Supreme Court is more 
deferential to the Second Circuit in light of the significant number of 
cases concerning financial markets regulation that this court decides. 
B.  Results: General Patterns 
In the following pages, this Article provides the results of the analysis. 
This Section discusses some general empirical findings. The next Section 
focuses on the correlation between the Justices’ ideology and their voting 
patterns. In the final Section, this Article offers some information on the 
rate of reversal correlated to the circuit court from which the case arose. 
Figure 2 below simply indicates the overall number of cases decided that 
were pro-business and pro-investor in the period considered. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 175. A special concurring opinion is written when the Justice agrees with the disposition of 
the case by the majority, but not with its reasoning.  
41
Fedderke and Ventoruzzo: Do Conservative Judges Favor Wall Street? Ideology and the Suprem
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
1252 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67 
 
 
While not particularly telling with respect to the key questions this 
Article raises, it is interesting that the Court has ruled more often in favor 
of business by a ratio of three to two. In this perspective, the data seem 
to confirm the concerns of Professor Chemerinsky mentioned in the 
Introduction.176  
The distribution of pro-business and pro-investor decisions over time 
is also thought provoking. Figure 3 breaks down the data in terms of the 
tenures of the Chief Justices. 
 
                                                                                                                     
 176. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.  
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Two important caveats are necessary. First, Chief Justice Warren 
Burger’s Court decided few securities regulation cases, making the 
percentage less meaningful. Therefore, the data are more interesting for 
the last three periods, meaning from the Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts 
Courts. Second, as this Article mentioned before, the Chief Justice is 
simply a first among peers: each time the President appoints a new Justice 
to the Court, the Court changes ideological composition. For this reason, 
it might make sense to divide the timeline into as many periods as 
different compositions of the Court have occurred. Nonetheless, the 
division by Chief Justices’ tenures gives a sense of the evolution of the 
Court and is a common and accepted means to distinguish different 
“periods” of the life of the Court (for example, commentators speak of 
the “Roberts Court” and the “Warren Court”). 
Given the limited number of cases decided during the tenure of Chief 
Justice Burger, let us focus on the last three periods. Here, it is intriguing 
to observe that, in securities regulation issues, the Rehnquist Court 
appears to be less conservative—less pro-business—than the Burger 
Court, which has a record similar to that of the pre-2011 Roberts Court. 
Looking at the general trend, it seems that over time the Court shifted to 
a more pro-business position, starting approximately in the early 1970s. 
This evolution seems consistent with the appointment of Justices Harry 
Blackmun, Lewis Powell, and William Rehnquist by President Richard 
Nixon in 1970 and 1971 and the shift of the Court to more conservative 
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positions. We are cautious, however, in drawing any particular inference 
from these still-aggregate data. 
Figure 4 indicates the percentage of cases (separating pro-business 
and pro-investor decisions) with at least one dissenting opinion during 
the tenures of the seven Chief Justices who served in the period covered 
by our research. 
 
This graph confirms, by the significant number of dissents, that 
securities regulation cases are often controversial, or at least that Justices 
are likely to voice their dissents. This might also be partially due to the 
fact that the Court has been deciding relatively fewer cases in total in 
recent decades, and therefore Justices might simply have more time to 
write separate opinions.177 But the finding is not inconsistent with the 
perception of a divided Court.  
In this perspective, it is also interesting to look at the percentage of 
dissents in pro-business and pro-investor decisions. Figures 5 and 6 offer 
insights in this respect.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 177. LAWRENCE BAUM, THE SUPREME COURT 107 (1985); GERHARD CASPER & RICHARD A. 
POSNER, THE WORKLOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT 79–80 (1976). 
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The pie charts indicate, interestingly enough, that pro-business 
decisions appear to be more controversial: in pro-business decisions, 
Justices have prepared three or four dissents in fifty-one percent of the 
cases, while only twenty percent of the cases in pro-investor decisions 
have three or four dissents.  
Next, this Article investigates economic conditions under alternative 
Court decisions, looking at some economic indicators at the time of pro-
business or pro-investor decisions.178 Figure 7 below illustrates the 
results. In Figure 7, each bar indicates the average value of the economic 
variable below when either pro-business or pro-investor decisions were 
rendered. For example, with “Inflation,” the graph indicates that, on 
average, when the Court handed down pro-business decisions, inflation 
was higher than when pro-investor decisions were rendered. More 
precisely, to avoid scale differences across the economic variables, for 
each economic variable that prevails under pro-business or pro-investor 
decisions, Figure 7 reports the average ratio of the full sample. Where the 
ratio is greater than 1, the implication is that, on average, the economic 
variable for that class of court decision (pro-business or pro-investor) 
assumes a value higher than the full sample average for that economic 
variable. Conversely, where the ratio is less than 1, the implication is that, 
on average, the economic variable for that class of court decision (pro-
business or pro-investor) assumes a value lower than the full sample 
                                                                                                                     
 178. Economic data sources are as follows: inflation data for the consumer price index is 
obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics; GDP data was sourced from the U.S. Bureau of 
Economic Analysis; the public (domestic and foreign) debt to GDP ratio was sourced from 
CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH ROGOFF, THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT: EIGHT CENTURIES OF 
FINANCIAL FOLLY (2009); the Dow Jones Index was sourced from the Federal Reserve Bank of 
St. Louis historical data series; and long term interest rates were obtained from Lawrence H. 
Office, What Was the Interest Rate Then?, MEASURING WORTH, http://www.measuringworth.com 
/interestrates/ (last visited May 1, 2015). 
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average for that economic variable. For instance, in the case of 
“Inflation,” the first two bars indicate that, on average, when pro-business 
decisions were rendered, inflation was approximately 20% higher than 
the full sample average inflation rate; when pro-investor decisions were 
rendered, inflation was approximately 20% below the full sample 
average. 
Because we are employing economic averages across substantial time 
periods, the analysis aggregates away any nuances that may attach to 
subperiods in the sample—an unavoidable constraint given the relatively 
small number of cases per subperiod. 
The results indicate that the Court is more likely to rule in favor of 
business when inflation, interest rates, and gross domestic product (GDP) 
growth (both nominal and real) are high, and the ratio of public debt to 
GDP and growth rate in the Dow Jones index is low.  
First, conditions of relatively high inflation, associated economic 
policy responses in the form of higher interest rates, and low growth rates 
in the Dow Jones index all indicate conditions of pressure (though not 
necessarily crisis) on asset markets and on net wealth positions of voters. 
Under these conditions, the Court appears to favor business in its 
rulings.179 Second, the increasing propensity of the Court to favor 
                                                                                                                     
 179. This has an immediate counterpart in the idea that concerns over inflation influence 
Republican voters more, while Democratic voters are more susceptible to concerns over 
unemployment. 
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investors under a rising ratio of public debt to GDP is consistent with at 
least two explanations.  
Increased public debt levels could be indicative of a more 
interventionist economic policy environment—either as an expression of 
countercyclical stimulatory fiscal policy (as was in place post-2007, for 
example) or by virtue of a greater commitment to the public provision of 
goods and services. The Court may simply be reflecting this broader 
policy preference. Alternatively, a rising debt to GDP ratio implies that 
the future expected tax burden has to increase symmetrically. The Court’s 
favoring of investors may reflect a concern for this increased expected 
tax burden. 
Finally, the finding that pro-business decisions correspond to periods 
of high economic growth is consistent with the finding in the literature 
that the Court reacts to the business cycle.180 It appears that where 
economic conditions are improving more rapidly, the Court is less 
disposed to impose additional regulation on the operation of business than 
it may be under less favorable economic conditions.  
There might be different ways to interpret the data that do not imply 
that economic conditions affect Justices when they render their decisions. 
For example, a higher percentage of pro-investor decisions at times of 
higher Dow Jones growth could simply mean that in periods of market 
euphoria more investors are lured to invest in securities, and statistically 
it is more likely that some of them are victims of illegal practices.181 
C.  Correlations Between Justices’ Ideology and Voting 
This Article finally addresses the key issue: whether conservative 
Justices are more pro-business and liberal Justices more pro-investor. The 
following graph, Figure 8, offers an important insight. 
                                                                                                                     
 180. See supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
 181. Admittedly, to argue that Justices take into account, for example, the level of inflation 
when deciding a case might seem questionable because some of the cases decided present very 
unique factual patterns that are difficult if not impossible to link to general economic conditions. 
It seems interesting however, that the evidence indicates—consistent with previous literature—
that there is a correlation between general economic conditions and the propensity of the Court to 
rule in favor of business or investors. 
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In this case, we have classified Justices as conservative or liberal 
based on the party of the appointing president, a coding that—for the 
reasons discussed above—is somewhat rough and simplistic, but still 
compelling. The results strongly support our hypothesis: conservative 
Justices vote consistently more pro-business (in 58% of the cases) than 
liberal Justices (in 60% of the cases, they vote pro-investor).  
Figure 9, below, refines this inquiry by coding the Justices based on 
the position of the appointing president on the liberal to conservative 
continuum for those presidents for which this information is available, as 
discussed above.182 
                                                                                                                     
 182. See supra Figure 1; supra note 103 and accompanying text.  
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A meaningful correlation appears. Justices appointed by more 
economically liberal presidents tend to vote more consistently in favor of 
investors, and appointees of more economically conservative presidents 
rule more often for businesses.  
The next plot, in Figure 10 below, examines the correlation between 
the Justices’ ideology as measured by the Segal–Cover scores and the 
voting patterns of the Justices. 
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As discussed above, the Segal–Cover score varies between 0 (very 
conservative) and +1 (very liberal). The graph indicates a meaningful 
correlation: more conservative Justices more frequently voted pro-
business, and more liberal Justices more often voted in favor of investors. 
Moreover, variations in the Segal–Cover score account for approximately 
27% of the variation in the percentage of pro-business decisions across 
all Justices in the sample. Considering the constraints that even the 
Supreme Court faces in judicial decision-making in terms of precedents 
and statutory interpretation, this is a rather strong indicator of a 
correlation between ideology and voting. 
Figure 11 examines the percentage of pro-business decisions against 
the Martin–Quinn scores of each Justice at the time of the decision. 
 
For this analysis, we used the average Martin–Quinn score over the 
relevant period for each Justice because we needed to correlate that data 
with the percentage of pro-business votes of the Justice. Bearing in mind 
that the Martin–Quinn score varies from very liberal (–6.656) to very 
conservative (+4.3999),183 we find a positive correlation between the 
position of the Justice on the ideology spectrum and their voting: more 
conservative Justices vote more often in favor of business. In this case,  
                                                                                                                     
 183. See supra notes 113–14. 
Stewart
BurgerWhite
Powell
Rehnquist
Stevens
Brennan
Marshall
Blackmun
Douglas
O'Connor
Scalia
47.61904762
Thomas
Souter
Ginsburg
Breyer
Roberts
Alito
Sotomayor
Minton
Black
KaganWarren
Harlan
Goldberg Stone
Clark
50
Murphy
Rutledge
50
Reed
Vinson
R² = 0.2134
-20
0
20
40
60
80
100
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 D
ec
is
io
ns
 P
ro
-B
us
in
es
s
Justice Martin-Quinn Score
Figure 11: Percentage Votes Pro-Business Against Average Justice 
Martin-Quinn Score
50
Florida Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 3 [2016], Art. 9
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol67/iss3/9
2015] IDEOLOGY AND THE SUPREME COURT’S SECURITIES REGULATION DECISIONS 1261 
 
 
the R2 value indicates that the ideology score explains over 20% of the 
likelihood to vote pro-business or pro-investor, a quite meaningful result.  
D.  Reversal of Different Circuits 
The last graph, Figure 12 below, does not address the correlation 
between Justices’ ideology and voting, but considers the total percentage 
of cases reversed or remanded, and breaks this percentage down by the 
circuit from which the case arose. These findings offer some basis for 
further research.  
There are at least two important observations from this data. First, in 
securities regulation issues, the Supreme Court tends to grant certiorari 
in cases that the Justices want to reverse or with which they disagree to 
some extent. The overall percentage of cases reversed or remanded is 
78%—a high number. Second, the Court appears to be more “deferential” 
to certain courts of appeals. For some circuits, the number of cases is too 
small and not very statistically significant: take, for example, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which was never reversed but only 
decided two cases, leaving the potential for this absence of reversal to be 
a mere aberration. More significant is the data for the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals for the Second and Seventh Circuits. These two circuits decide 
a high number of securities lawsuits because they include New York and 
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Chicago, the two principal U.S. financial centers. As a result, their judges 
have a particular expertise in issues of financial regulation, and the 
Supreme Court is less inclined to overrule them than it is other courts.  
Of course from the point of view of this Article, which investigates 
primarily the correlation between ideology and voting patterns, it would 
also be interesting to test if a “conservative” Supreme Court more often 
overruled “liberal” courts of appeals, and vice versa. This question can 
be the subject of future research.  
CONCLUSION 
According to Justice John Paul Stevens’s memoir about his years at 
the Supreme Court, in 1946 the gym was situated directly above the 
courtroom.184 A law clerk shooting basketballs during a hearing disturbed 
the Justices, and Chief Justice Fred Vinson introduced an unwritten rule 
that no basketball was allowed during oral arguments.185 Most likely, the 
Justices unanimously agreed on this decision independent of their 
ideological preferences.  
When the Justices meet to decide cases dealing with financial 
regulation issues, however, their ideology appears to have a seat at the 
conference table. This Article has demonstrated that more conservative 
Justices vote more often in favor of business, and more liberal ones vote 
more often in favor of investors. In other words, there is a correlation 
between the voting of the Justices and their position on the political 
spectrum, and this appears to be consistent using different measures of 
the ideology or political affiliations of the Justices.  
Of course, there are exceptions to this general statistical trend, and this 
confirms the independence of Supreme Court Justices. However, this 
Article’s findings do not in any way imply that the Justices distort the law 
to pursue a personal agenda, that they favor certain defendants, or even 
that they are “activists.” The observation that ideology plays a role in 
their decision-making might simply mean that when the law is 
ambiguous, or does not clearly resolve an issue, the Justices’ views 
concerning the underlying policy of the securities laws affect their 
reading of complex legal issues, as should be the case.  
This Article also offers additional insights on the work of the Court in 
securities disputes. For example, it appears that in more recent years the 
Court has become increasingly divided—at least considering the number 
of dissents published—and more conservative (i.e., more pro-business). 
This is especially evident when comparing the Roberts Court to the 
                                                                                                                     
 184. STEVENS, supra note 17, at 61–62. 
 185. Id. The clerk causing the disturbance was Byron White, the first former law clerk who 
a President (Kennedy) later appointed as a Justice. Id. 
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Rehnquist Court. The empirical evidence in this Article offers a different 
perspective than the findings of Professor Pritchard in an article already 
mentioned on securities laws under the Roberts Court, according to which 
the Roberts Court appears less pro-business and more inclined to 
maintain the status quo with respect to Rule 10b-5 class actions.186 The 
different outcomes are not necessarily in conflict, however, considering 
the different scope and methodology of his research and that presented in 
this Article.  
The data also indicate that pro-business decisions seem more 
controversial, again considering the number of dissents. This result might 
suggest that liberal Justices are more active than are conservative ones in 
voicing their positions when they are not satisfied with a decision.  
Finally, this Article’s evidence suggests that the Court may take into 
some account, at least implicitly and maybe unconsciously, the general 
economic conditions in its decisions in the area of financial markets.  
  
                                                                                                                     
 186. See Pritchard, supra note 27, at 135.  
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